If the International Shoe Fits, Wear It: Applying Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Analysis to Cyberspace in Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson by Logue, Daniel V.
Volume 42 Issue 4 Article 3 
1997 
If the International Shoe Fits, Wear It: Applying Traditional 
Personal Jurisdiction Analysis to Cyberspace in Compuserve, Inc. 
v. Patterson 
Daniel V. Logue 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel V. Logue, If the International Shoe Fits, Wear It: Applying Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Analysis 
to Cyberspace in Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 1213 (1997). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss4/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1997]
Notes
IF THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE FITS, WEAR IT:
APPLYING TRADITIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
ANALYSIS TO CYBERSPACE IN COMPUSERVE,
INC. V. PATTERSON
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last few years, cyberspace I has experienced unparalleled
growth. 2 As a result, the Internet 3 has become a global force, replacing
1. See EDWARD A. CAvAzos & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAw: YOUR
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WoRLD 1 (1993) (defining "cyberspace"). The
term "cyberspace" was originally coined in the early 1980s by science-fiction writer
William Gibson in his award-winning science fiction novel, Neuromancer. See id.
(discussing origin and use of term "cyberspace"). Gibson used the term to de-
scribe a "consensual hallucination" that appeared like physical space, but was actu-
ally a computer-generated construct created through computer data systems and
networks. See id. Today, the word "cyberspace" refers to the collection of on-line
virtual communities as a whole. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace:
Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197,
198 n.5 (1995) ("As commonly used today, cyberspace is the conceptual 'location'
of the electronic interactivity available using one's computer.").
2. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (discussing Internet development and expansion), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997). By 1981, only "300 computers were linked to the Internet." See id. In
1989, the number of connected computers increased to around 90,000. See id.
(discussing growth of Internet). Then, in 1993, over 1 million computers were
connected to the Internet. See id. Currently, it is estimated that over 9.4 million
computers are linked to the Internet. See id. It has been projected that by 1999,
the number of Internet users will have grown to 200 million. See id.; see also George
P. Long, III, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U. Pirr. L. REV.
1177, 1180 (1994) (noting unprecedented expansion of Internet).
3. See Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925-26 (describing
development of Internet), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997). The "Internet" is the term
formally used to describe the collection of more than 50,000 networks that link
together almost ninety countries. See id. at 925 (discussing nature and develop-
ment of Internet). Originally developed by the Department of Defense's Ad-
vanced Research Projects Administration ("ARPA"), the Internet was an
experimental project designed to provide researchers with direct access to
supercomputers located at certain laboratories and to facilitate communication
between them. See id. Universities, research facilities and commercial entities that
were interested in this unique method of electronic information transfer began to
develop their own networks and link them to the ARPA Network, which became
known as the "ARPAnet." See id. at 925-26. Supplanted by the growth of the in-
dependent networks, ARPAnet ceased operations in 1990. See id. at 926. There-
fore, what is commonly now referred to as the Internet is a series of linked
networks that "merely use the same data transfer protocols." Id.
Through the Internet, an individual can access the World Wide Web, which
has become "the best known method for locating and accessing information" by
computer. Id. at 929. The World Wide Web refers to documents available on serv-
(1213)
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physical interaction with virtual communities.4 Given its magnitude and
revolutionary nature, the question arises as to whether cyberspace trans-
gresses the bounds of traditional legal doctrine. 5
One area of the law that cyberspace seems inherently in conflict with
is that of personal jurisdiction. 6 While traditional personal jurisdiction
doctrine is rooted in concepts of sovereignty and territoriality, interaction
in cyberspace does not involve any contact with the physical world. 7 Nev-
ertheless, because the Internet cannot exist separately from the physical
world and its use has consequences in that world, it appears that cyber-
space should fall within the scope of traditional jurisdictional principles. 8
ers around the world, all of which use Web server software. See id. Any individual
can use the Internet to access a specific document at its uniform resource locator
("URL"). See id.
4. See Byassee, supra note 1, at 198 (noting effect of Internet on society). It
has been noted that the revolution created by the Internet has hardly begun to
affect society. See id. (stating that "changes in how average citizens carry on their
everyday lives have barely begun"). Thus, "the next ten years will position the com-
puter as a primary tool of societal interation." Id.; see also Bill Slocum, Cyber-Retail-
ers Hitting the Web for Wider Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 1 (featuring store
proprietor who closed store front and conducts business over Internet).
5. See generally Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fair-
ness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339, 341 (1996)
(noting discussion of applicability of present law to cyberspace).
6. See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACrIONS § 1.01 (2) (2d ed.
1991) (discussing necessity of personal jurisdiction in our legal system). Personal
jurisdiction, also referred to as in personam jurisdiction, is the power to subject a
particular defendant to the decision of a particular court. See id. (noting that tradi-
tional jurisdiction doctrine is based on notion that "court must have jurisdiction of
the person of the parties before it can obligate them to comply with its orders").
Thus, a court's power to adjudicate a dispute depends upon whether the court has
personal jurisdiction "of the person of the defendant." Id. For a detailed discus-
sion of personal jurisdiction doctrine, see infra notes 16-65 and accompanying text.
7. See Byassee, supra note 1, at 198 n.5 ("Cyberspace is a place 'without physi-
cal walls or even physical dimensions' in which interaction occurs as if it happened
in the real world and in real time, but constitutes only a 'virtual reality."' (quoting
Lawrence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Elec-
tronic Frontier, THE HuMANIsT, Mar. 26, 1991, at 15)); Esther Dyson, Put Friction Back
in Cyberspace, FORBES ASAP, Dec. 2, 1996, at 99 ("Life has friction, texture, distance,
direction; those inconvenient physical conditions are a part of human life that
we'll miss sorely as we move into the digital environment .... ");Jonathan Freed-
land, The Writing on the Toilet Wal4 THE GuARDIAN, Feb. 14, 1995, at 18 (noting that
Internet is nonphysical entity). For a discussion of the concepts that form the basis
of personal jurisdiction doctrine, see infra note 20 and accompanying text.
8. See Byassee, supra note 1, at 199 (stating that although cyberspace tran-
scends geographical boundaries, "it cannot exist independently of the real
world"); Zembek, supra note 5, at 341-42 (asserting that cyberspace cannot exist
separate from physical world ); see also ErikJ. Heels & Richard P. Klau, Let's Make a
Few Things Perfectly Clear: Cyberspace, the Internet, and That Superhighway, STUDENT
LAw., May 1995, at 17 ("Never forget that the Internet is simply a bunch of inter-
connected wires, with computers at the ends of the wires, and with people in front
of the computers.").
1214 [Vol. 42: p. 1213
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In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,9 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit concluded that cyberspace is subject to traditional
jurisdiction analysis and that cyberspace contacts may provide a basis for
the assertion ofjurisdiction.10 This Note discusses the application of tradi-
tional jurisdictional principles to litigation arising from electronic contacts
on the Internet. Part II delineates the requirements for establishing per-
sonal jurisdiction in accord with due process, focusing specifically upon
the principles enumerated by the Supreme Court." Part III discusses the
facts and procedural history of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Patterson.12
Part IV provides a critical analysis of the Patterson decision and suggests
that the Sixth Circuit properly applied existing precedent in evaluating
whether Internet contacts serve as a basis for the exercise of personal juris-
diction.13 Finally, Part V discusses the effect that Patterson will have in fu-
ture Internet jurisdiction cases and upon the cyberspace community.' 4
Part V also asserts that Patterson establishes much needed precedent in an
area threatened by mass litigation. 15
II. BACKGROUND: LIMITATIONS ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Constitutional Limitations on the Assertion of Personal Jurisdiction
For over fifty years, International Shoe Co. v. Washington'6 has served as
the foundation for determining whether a state court may exercise per-
9. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
10. See id. at 1264-65 (applying traditional jurisdiction analysis to cyberspace
contacts).
11. For a discussion of the traditional principles of jurisdiction and the re-
quirements for establishing jurisdiction in cyberspace, see infra notes 16-86 and
accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Patterson, see infra
notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
13. For a critical discussion of the court's analysis in Patterson, see infra notes
112-63 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the social and legal impact of the Patterson decision,
see infra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the necessity of the Patterson decision in the wake of
recent technological developments, see infra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Under International Shoe, the Supreme Court devel-
oped the standard for deciding whether a court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant. See id. at 317-20 (developing minimum contacts test
for determining whether court's exercise ofjurisdiction is proper). In International
Shoe, the State of Washington sued a Missouri-based Delaware corporation to col-
lect unpaid unemployment compensation. Id. at 311. The Supreme Court held
that by employing salesmen to solicit business in the state of Washington, the de-
fendant established sufficient contacts with the state to reasonably permit the state
to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. See id. at 320. For a more thorough
discussion of International Shoe, see Rex R. Perschbacher, Fifty Years of International
Shoe: The Past and Future of PersonalJurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 513, 515-18
(1995) (providing social and political setting in which International Shoe was de-
cided and discussing Supreme Court's holding).
1997] NOTE 1215
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sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.17 In departing from the
physical presence requirement established in Pennoyer v. Neff,18 Interna-
tional Shoe redefined personal jurisdiction analysis.' 9 Under International
Shoe, jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper when the defend-
ant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state, such that exer-
cising jurisdiction does not "'offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.'-20
In the fifty years following International Shoe, the Supreme Court has
made several attempts at refining the minimum contacts test.2 1 The stan-
17. See CAsAD, supra note 6, § 1.02 (discussing concept of personal jurisdiction
and noting that International Shoe has served as foundation of modern personal
jurisdiction law).
18. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977). Under Pennoyer, the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
was only proper when the defendant was physically present in the forum state. See
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722; see alsOJAcK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.3,
at 98 (2d ed. 1993) (noting Pennoyers physical presence requirement for exercise
of jurisdiction). The presence requirement was rooted in state sovereignty and
constitutional concerns. See id. In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court stated that
[t]he several states of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect in-
dependent .... But, except as restrained and limited by [the Constitu-
tion], they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and
the principles of public law . . .are applicable to them. One of these
principles is, that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sover-
eignty over persons and property within its territory.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. The Supreme Court further held that "no State can exer-
cise directjurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory."
Id.
19. See Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "Fair Play and SubstantialJustice": How the
Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 441, 442 (1991) (demonstrating how International Shoe changed approach to
personal jurisdiction). The International Shoe decision did not replace the presence
requirement, it merely redefined it for the twentieth century. See Perschbacher,
supra note 16, at 517 (emphasizing that term "physical presence" merely symbol-
izes activities that are significant enough to satisfy due process principles). The
emergence of interstate travel in the early twentieth century revealed the limita-
tions of Pennoyer's nineteenth-century jurisdictional doctrine and created the
need for a new theory. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 18, § 310, at 123 (noting
that more flexible standard for assertion of personal jurisdiction was suited to pro-
gressively more mobile society). When the Supreme Court abolished the physical
presence requirement, it refocused jurisdictional concerns on the premise that "a
nonresident's enjoyment of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state
carries with it an obligation to respond to suit there." Id. § 3.10, at 121.
20. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have separated the Inter-
national Shoe standard into a two-step due process analysis by requiring a showing
of "minimum contacts" before considering whether the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." See
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.10, at 121 (discussing Supreme Court's re-
finement of International Shoe standard); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294, 298-99 (1980) (holding that fairness concerns are
irrelevant when minimum contacts do not exist).
21. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-12,
116 (1987) (holding that mere placement of products into stream of commerce is
1216
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dard applied when determining whether minimum contacts exist depends
upon whether the court seeks to establish general or specific jurisdiction
over the defendant.2 2 General jurisdiction refers to a court's ability to
assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for any lawsuit," [e]ven
when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the [defend-
ant's] activities in the forum State."23 To establish general jurisdiction,
there must be substantial contacts between the defendant and the forum
state. 24 In contrast, specific jurisdiction involves an assertion of jurisdic-
insufficient to satisfy minimum contacts requirement); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985) (stating that "prior negotiations and contem-
plated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties'
actual course of dealing" are relevant in determining whether minimum contacts
exist with forum state); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 413-19 (1984) (finding that minimum contacts did not exist when de-
fendant merely purchased goods and sent personnel for training in forum state);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) (holding that exercise of jurisdiction
was valid when defendant circulated libelous article in forum state); Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (allowing exercise ofjurisdiction over
publisher in state where its national publication was regularly sold and distrib-
uted); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296-98 (stating that minimum contacts
are not established when nonresident defendant does not direct activity toward
forum state); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-12 (1977) (finding that state
must pass International Shoe's "minimum contacts" test before asserting jurisdiction
over nonresident defendant); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-53 (1958)
(holding Delaware trust company's affiliation with Florida too tenuous to support
assertion of jurisdiction because of lack of contacts); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (finding single insurance contract sufficient to
establish minimum contacts between nonresident defendant and forum state).
For a more thorough discussion of International Shoe and its progeny, see
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 18, §§ 3.1-.13, at 94-147.
22. See Zembek, supra note 5, at 348-49 (discussing different threshold re-
quirements for general versus specific jurisdiction). In 1966, Professors Arthur T.
von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman formally made the distinction between gen-
eral and specific jurisdiction. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1135-45
(1966) (identifying two categories of personal jurisdiction as specific and general).
Mark M. Maloney, Note Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the "Arise From or Relate To"
Requirement . . . What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1265, 1268 (1993)
(identifying two distinct contexts that satisfy minimum contacts prong). The
Supreme Court recognized the distinction between specific and general jurisdic-
tion in Helicopteros. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9.
23. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952)). The premise for general jurisdiction was originally ar-
ticulated in International Shoe, in which the Supreme Court noted: "[T]here have
been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." International
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
24. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.10, at 124 (discussing stricter
test to establish general jurisdiction); see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16 (hold-
ing that continuous and systematic general business contacts with state were neces-
sary to establish general jurisdiction); Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447 (requiring that
contacts be sufficiently substantial "where the cause of action arose from activities
entirely distinct from [defendant's] activities in [forum state]"); International Shoe,
5
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tion the cause of action is based upon the defendant's activity in the forum
state.
25
Determining whether a court may exercise specific jurisdiction in-
volves a two-part analysis.26 First, a court must decide whether jurisdiction
is appropriate under the forum state's long arm statute. 27 Second, and
only if a court has determined that the statute permits the exercise ofjuris-
diction, the court must then determine whether the assertion of jurisdic-
tion comports with due process.28 The Supreme Court has developed a
three-part test to determine whether the assertion of specific jurisdiction
over a defendant is constitutional: "(1) the defendant must purposefully
avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum; (2) the
326 U.S. at 320 (holding jurisdiction to exist when defendant's forum state activi-
ties were "systematic and continuous").
25. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (discussing concept of specific jurisdic-
tion). In Patterson, the court determined it had specific jurisdiction over the de-
fendant. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus,
this Note will focus on specific jurisdiction requirements.
26. See Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework
for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REv.
1083, 1117 (1996) (discussing use of two-part analysis to determine if court can
exercise specific jurisdiction).
27. See id. at 1117-18 (describing first step in evaluatingjurisdictional validity);
see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413 (commenting that trial court must first deter-
mine if present situation is within scope of long arm statute).
Long-arm... statutes predicate jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
upon a variety of contacts with the forum, including the transaction of
business in the state, the commission of any one of a series of enumerated
acts within the state.., or... the commission of a particular act outside
the forum that has consequences within it.
FRIEDENTHAL ET U.., supra note 18, § 3.12, at 139. For instance, New York's long
arm statute, which is similar to the statutes enacted in many states, provides:
(a) Acts which are the basis ofjurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising
from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or admin-
istrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to
supply goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person
or property within the state ... ; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
28. See Counts & Martin, supra note 26, at 1118-19 (discussing second part of
analysis in determining validity of jurisdiction). Some state long arm statutes pro-
vide: "A court Of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent
with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE
§ 410.10 (West 1997). In these states, the jurisdictional analysis is reduced to a
consideration of due process concerns. SeeJAMEs FLEMING, CrvIL PROCEDURE § 2.6,
at 63 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that because state long arm statutes allow exercise of
jurisdiction to extent permitted under Constitution, jurisdictional inquiry is re-
duced to due process concerns).
1218 [Vol. 42: p. 1213
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cause of action must arise out of the defendant's activities in the forum;
and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be fundamentally fair."29
1. Purposeful Availment Requirement
The first prong of specific jurisdiction analysis focuses upon whether
the defendant's contacts with the forum state were intentional.
30
Founded upon fairness concerns, the purposeful availment requirement
limits the exercise of jurisdiction to those defendants who have enjoyed
the benefits and protections of the forum state and, thus, "should reason-
29. Zembek, supra note 5, at 352-53; see also Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381,
1388-89 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit utilizes three-part analysis to decide whether court may exercise specific
jurisdiction); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.
1993) (noting that United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit uses three-
part test in determining whether exercise of specific jurisdiction is permissible);
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1546 (lth Cir. 1992) (requir-
ing that defendant's contacts with forum state satisfy three criteria to constitute
minimum contacts for purposes of specific jurisdiction); Southern Mach. Co. v.
Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968) (establishing three criteria
for determining outer limits of specific jurisdiction).
The "purposeful availment" requirement was derived from a case in which the
Supreme Court held that "it is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
Hanson v. Denckla 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see also Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at
381 (deriving "purposeful availment" requirement from Hanson). The Supreme
Court has continually utilized the "purposeful availment" requirement in assessing
the existence of specific jurisdiction. SeeAsahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 109, 112 (1987) (requiring that contact be brought about by act of
defendant purposefully directed toward forum state); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985) (holding minimum contacts to exist where
"defendant 'deliberately' has engaged in significant activities within a State"); Kee-
ton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (finding that existence of
minimum contacts was "unquestionable" when defendant purposefully directed ac-
tions toward forum state).
The requirement that the cause of action arise from the defendant's conduct
within the state derives from a case in which the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is
sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which
had substantial connection with [the] State [of California]." McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); see also Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at
381 (deriving second prong of minimum contacts test from McGee). The "fair play
and substantial justice" requirement is applied to general jurisdiction cases as well.
See Abramson, supra note 19, at 445 n.22 (noting that "fair play and substantial
justice" element is considered in both general and specific jurisdiction cases).
30. See Flavio Rose, Comment, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The
"But For" Test, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1545, 1554 (1994) (explaining that purposeful avail-
ment hinges on whether defendant's involvement in forum state was intentional);
see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109 (" 'Jurisdiction is proper ... where the contacts proxi-
mately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial con-
nection' with the forum State'" (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475) (emphasis in
original)); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)
("[T] he mere unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
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ably anticipate[ ] being haled into court there."3 1 Moreover, the pur-
poseful availment requirement furnishes personal jurisdiction with a
"degree of predictability" by limiting jurisdiction to those who intention-
ally direct their activities toward the forum state and are aware of the po-
tential for having to litigate there. 32
Therefore, application of the purposeful availment test involves a fact-
specific inquiry. 33 For example, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 34 the
Supreme Court held that by purposefully entering into a long-term
franchise agreement with the plaintiff, a Michigan resident had purposely
31. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. Some commentators argue that
the purposeful availment requirement is premised on the notion of consenting to
jurisdiction. See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 699-703 (1987) (arguing that defendant
surrenders to state's judicial authority when defendant engages in purposeful activ-
ity within that state). Under this theory, a defendant engaging in activities in the
forum state is said to "surrender herself to its judicial authority." Id. at 699-700.
Thus, the theory is based upon the notion of an exchange:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and,
so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond
to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to
be undue.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
32. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. In discussing the purposeful avail-
ment requirement, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court stated that:
[w] hen a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State," it has clear notice that it is sub-
ject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation
by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to consumers, or,
if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State.
Id. For a further discussion of World-Wide Volkswagen, see infra notes 40-43 and
accompanying text.
33. See Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 716 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting
that 'Jurisdictional inquiry is often a difficult fact specific analysis"); Sawtelle, 70
F.3d at 1388 ("When embarking upon the fact-sensitive inquiry of whether a forum
may assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court's task is not a rote,
mechanical exercise."); Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 1994) ("The inquiry
into minimum contacts is also highly idiosyncratic, involving an individualized as-
sessment and factual analysis of the precise mix of contacts that characterize each
case."); Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that
"totality of the facts" did not support exercise of jurisdiction); Johnson Controls,
Inc. v. Irving Rubber & Metal Co., 920 F. Supp. 612, 617 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating
that, with few exceptions, jurisdictional questions are decided on specific facts of
each case); Travelers Indem. Co. v. TEC Am., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 249, 251 (M.D. Pa.
1995) (same); Reliable Tool & Mach. Co. v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 274,
279 (N.D. Ind. 1993) ("In determining whether minimum contacts exist.., the
court must consider all of the facts and circumstances of the individual case.");
Associated Bus. Tel. Sys. Corp. v. Danihels, 829 F. Supp. 707, 711 (D.N.J. 1993)
(stating that purposeful availment determination involves "a fact specific inquiry
wherein there will be no clear cut answers").
34. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
1220
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established sufficient contacts with the state of Florida.35 Although the
Court considered the existence of a contract significant, it held that the
mere existence of a contract could not automatically support an exercise
of jurisdiction because personal jurisdiction does not turn on such a
"'mechanical' test[ ]" or "conceptualistic theor[y]." 36 The Court, there-
fore, adopted a "highly realistic" approach and, based on the defendant's
solicitation of the contract, the specific contract terms and the course of
dealings, concluded that the defendant's Florida contacts were not "'ran-
dom,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated.' 
3 7
As a result of the technological and economic progress of the twenti-
eth century, courts have attempted to expand the purposeful availment
prong to incorporate contacts arising between a nonresident defendant
and the forum state through a "stream of commerce" analysis. 38 When
35. See id. at 487. In Burger King, the defendants were issued a Burger King
franchise in Michigan pursuant to a written contract with the plaintiff. See id. at
466. Contract negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendant took place
with representatives from both the plaintiffs Michigan and Florida headquarters.
See id. at 467. In exchange for the franchise, the defendants became obligated to
pay the plaintiff $1 million over the course of twenty years. See id. Although the
defendants' franchise was prosperous at first, business began to decline within the
first year of operation. See id. at 468. At that time, the defendants began to default
on their monthly payments. See id. After several officials from the plaintiff's head-
quarters in Florida failed in their attempts to negotiate with the defendants, the
plaintiff ordered the defendants to vacate the premises. See id. Upon the defend-
ants' refusal to vacate, the plaintiff filed an action for trademark infringement and
sought injunctive relief against the defendants. See id. at 468-69.
36. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478; see also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319
("It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit.., cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative."). For a list of lower court decisions applying a non-
mechanical analysis in assessing purposeful contacts, see supra note 33 and accom-
panying text.
37. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1953); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299)).
38. See Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory:
A Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 Ky. L.J. 243, 255-58 (1988-1989) (discussing
concept of personal jurisdiction arising out of contacts made through ordinary
course of commerce). The term "stream of commerce" refers to a product sold by
a manufacturer traveling through "an extensive chain of distribution before reach-
ing the ultimate consumer." Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 298
(3d Cir. 1985). Under the "stream of commerce" analysis, a manufacturer may be
held amenable to jurisdiction in a forum in which the manufacturer's products are
sold indirectly through importers or distributors. See Erik T. Moe, Comment,
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream of Commerce Doctrine, Barely
Alive But Still Kicking, 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 204 (1987) (noting that stream of com-
merce theory posits that use of intermediary does not insulate manufacturer from
jurisdiction). "In such cases, it was felt the presence of a distributor should not
shield a manufacturer, whose products had caused harm to residents of the forum
state, from the reach of the forum state's long-arm rule." Daetwyler, 762 F.2d at
299.
The stream of commerce theory was first introduced into the area of personal
jurisdiction to sustain jurisdiction in products liability cases. See id. at 298 (noting
9
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addressing contacts arising from the stream of commerce, however, the
Supreme Court has held that the mere foreseeability that a product may
enter the forum state does not amount to purposeful availment.39 For
instance, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,40 the plaintiffs
purchased a car in New York from the defendant, a New York auto re-
tailer, and were later injured in a car accident while driving through
Oklahoma.41 In denying Oklahoma's jurisdiction over the defendant, the
Supreme Court held that "the mere 'unilateral activity of those who claim
that stream of commerce theory "evolved to sustain jurisdiction in products liabil-
ity cases"). In one of the first cases to apply the stream of commerce theory, an
Ohio manufacturer was held subject to jurisdiction in Illinois, where one of its
water heater valves exploded and injured an Illinois resident. See Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 762, 767 (111. 1961). The
Illinois Supreme Court applied the stream of commerce theory:
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the growing
interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a manufacturer
deals directly with consumers in other States. The fact that the benefit he
derives from its laws is an indirect one, however, does not make it any the
less essential to the conduct of his business; and it is not unreasonable,
where a cause of action arises from alleged defects in his product, to say
that the use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is suffi-
cient contact with this State to justify a requirement that he defend here.
Id. at 766. The Gray court also discussed the need for a stream of commerce the-
ory in the face of technological and economic progress:
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by
technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may
have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to
reality, and injustice rather than justice is promoted. Our unchanging
principles ofjustice, whether procedural or substantive in nature, should
be scrupulously observed by the courts. But the rules of law which grow
and develop within those principles must do so in light of the facts of
economic life as it is lived today. Otherwise the need for adaption may
become so great that basic rights are sacrificed in the name of reform,
and the principles themselves become impaired.
Id.
Nevertheless, application of the stream of commerce theory has caused a
great deal of confusion in both state and federal courts. See Murphy, supra, at 257-
73 (discussing origins of and confusion caused by stream of commerce theory);
PamelaJ. Stephens, Sovereignty and PersonalJurisdiction Doctrine: Up the Stream of Com-
merce Without a Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 110-13 (1991) (describing split
among jurisdictions in application of stream of commerce theory); Moe, supra,
211-15 (noting division among lower courts applying stream of commerce theory).
39. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)
("[A]wareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the
forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream
into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State."); World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 296-97 (holding that foreseeable contacts alone cannot support exer-
cise of jurisdiction).
40. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
41. See id. at 288-89 (describing details of accident giving rise to lawsuit). In
World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs, residents of New York, purchased a new Audi
automobile from the defendant. See id. at 288. Within a year, the plaintiffs moved
from New York to their new home in Arizona. See id. While passing through
Oklahoma, another car struck the rear of the plaintiffs' car, causing a fire severely
burned one of the plaintiffs and their two children. See id. The plaintiffs subse-
1222
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some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the require-
ment of contact with the forum state." 42 Thus, although it was foresee-
able that the plaintiffs might travel to Oklahoma, the Court reasoned that
foreseeable contacts alone do not provide a defendant with reasonable
notice of the possibility of litigation in the forum state.4 3
In Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court,44 however, the Court left
uncertain the status of the foreseeability argument in stream of commerce
cases.45 In Asahi, tire valves sold by the defendant, a Japanese manufac-
turer, were used in a motorcycle tire that exploded and caused injury to
the plaintiff, a California resident.4 6 The Asahi Court was divided on the
quently filed a products liability action against the defendant in the state of
Oklahoma. See id.
42. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
43. See id. at 298-99 (finding that foreseeability of plaintiff's actions did not
support exercise ofjurisdiction). Although the World-Wide Volkswagen Court found
foreseeability alone to be insufficient, it did include foreseeability as a relevant
factor in the due process inquiry:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it
is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
... The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Pro-
cess Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that deliv-
ers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.
Id. at 297-98.
44. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
45. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.11, at 137 (stating that Asahi
Court did not develop clear standard for determining minimum contacts for man-
ufacturing cases). For a further discussion of the uncertainty arising out of Asahi
with regard to the stream of commerce theory, see infra note 50 and accompany-
ing text.
46. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-07 (emphasizing that item which caused acci-
dent was manufactured in foreign country). The action was originally brought
against Cheng Shin Rubber, the manufacturer of the motorcycle's tire tube. See id.
at 106. Cheng Shin cross-complained, seeking indemnification from Asahi, the
manufacturer who supplied Cheng Shin with valve assemblies for its tire tubes. See
id. Because the plaintiff settled with Cheng Shin prior to trial, only the indemnity
action against Asahi remained. See id.
The Court discussed the nature of Asahi's valve sales:
Asahi's sales to Cheng Shin took place in Taiwan.... Cheng Shin bought
and incorporated into its tire tubes 150,000 Asahi valve assemblies in
1978; 500,000 in 1979; 500,000 in 1980; and 100,000 in 1982. Sales to
Cheng Shin accounted for 1.24 percent of Asahi's income in 1981 and
0.44 percent in 1982. Cheng Shin alleged that approximately 20 percent
of its sales in the United States are in California. Cheng Shin purchases
valve assemblies from other suppliers as well, and sells finished tubes
throughout the world.
Id. at 106. The Court also considered an affidavit from a manager at Cheng Shin
stating that "'Asahi was fully aware that valve stem assemblies sold to my Company
and to others would end up throughout the United States and in California.'" Id.
at 107 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 549-50 n.4
(Cal. 1985)).
11
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issue of whether the defendant's conduct established minimum contacts
with California. 4 7 Justice O'Connor stated for the plurality that Asahi's
mere awareness that its valve assemblies would be used in California was
not sufficiently purposeful conduct to establish minimum contacts.48 In
contrast, Justice Brennan opined that the defendant's knowledge that its
product was being marketed in California was sufficient to support a find-
ing of minimum contacts. 49 Thus, although the Court has held that pur-
47. Id. at 105 (noting division within Court over whether minimum contacts
were established between defendant and forum state). Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Powell and Justice Scalia agreed with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that
minimum contacts did not exist between the defendant and the state of California.
See id. Justice White,Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmunjoined injustice Bren-
nan's concurring opinion, in which he argued that the defendant's awareness that
its products were present in California was sufficient to satisfy the purposeful avail-
ment requirement. See id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring). In a separate concur-
ring opinion, Justice Stevens refused to endorse the plurality view on the basis that
it was unnecessary to discuss purposeful availment when reversal could be sup-
ported on fairness grounds. See id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring). In address-
ing whether the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable, however, eight Justices
agreed that allowing California to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant would
be unfair. See id. at 105.
48. See id. at 112-13 (finding that minimum contacts were not established due
to lack of purposeful contact). In commenting upon the stream of commerce the-
ory, Justice O'Connor specifically stated that
[t]he "substantial connection" between the defendant and the forum
State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an
action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. The place-
ment of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an
act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Addi-
tional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to
serve the market in the forum State .... But a defendant's awareness
that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the fo-
rum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.
Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
49. See id. at 121 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that sufficient contacts
existed to provide jurisdictional basis). In addressing the stream of commerce the-
ory, Justice Brennan stated that
[t] he stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies,
but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to
distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware
that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.... A defendant who has
placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically from the
retail sale of the final product in the forum State, and indirectly from the
State's laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity. These bene-
fits accrue regardless of whether that participant directly conducts busi-
ness in the forum State, or engages in additional conduct directed toward
that State. Accordingly .... jurisdiction premised on the placement of a
product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the Due Process
Clause.
Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan further discussed that, at
that time, the position of the plurality regarding the stream of commerce theory
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poseful conduct on the part of the defendant is required to establish
minimum contacts, there is uncertainty over whether the stream of com-
merce theory satisfies the contacts requirement after Asahi.50
2. Cause of Action
Under the second prong of specific jurisdictional analysis, courts
must establish that the cause of action arose from or relates to the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum state.5A Because the "arise from or relate to"
50. See Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that because of Asahi Court's uncertainty with regard to stream of
commerce theory, analysis of World-Wide Volkswagen Court should be followed);
Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that Asahi
.casts some doubt on the future viability of the stream of commerce theory"); see
also Kim Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 REv. Li-IG. 239,
245 (1988) (stating that some courts have interpreted Asahi "as sounding the death
knell for the stream of commerce theory," while other courts have "simply ignored
Asahi's pronouncements"); Moe, supra note 38, at 205-06 (noting that Asahi
Court's failure to achieve concensus has caused confusion as to application of
stream of commerce theory in future cases).
In proposing a solution to the uncertainty of the stream of commerce theory,
one commentator has argued for the application ofJustice Brennan's "awareness"
requirement. See id. at 223-28 (arguing that Justice Brennan's "awareness" ap-
proach is favorable because "it closes a potential jurisdictional loophole available
to a defendant who willfully or negligently ignores the destination of its prod-
ucts"). The. commentator concluded that although the stream of commerce the-
ory is still viable, it is Justice Brennan's approach that should be followed. See id.
UnderJustice Brennan's approach, the exercise ofjurisdiction over manufacturers
who place their product in the stream of commerce is permissible when the manu-
facturer was "aware of [the] ultimate destination" of the product. Id. at 223-24.
Thus, the commentator argued thatJustice Brennan's approach is consistent with
prior Supreme Court precedent because it allows for the exercise of jurisdiction
when the manufacturer defendant has benefitted from the forum state. See id. at
224. The difficulty with Justice Brennan's approach, however, is that it depends
upon the ability of the plaintiff to show that the defendant was aware of the desti-
nation of its product. See id. at 225. In response to this dilemma, the commentator
suggested application of the "'know"' or "'should have known"' standard in order
to allow the court to base their finding of knowledge upon the facts of the case. See
id. (quoting Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1980)). Under this
approach, courts are better able to ensure fairness because the purposeful avail-
ment requirement can be met through a review of the totality of the circum-
stances. See id. at 226 ("[T]he analysis should include an examination of the
quantity and continuity of forum sales, form market share, forum revenue ...
length of exposure to the forum market, and whether the product was destined for
United States or international markets.").
51. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (stating that
exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper where litigation "'arise [s] out of or re-
late [s] to"' defendant's forum activities (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). The "arise from or relate to"
requirement originated in International Shoe, when the Supreme Court held that
conducting activities in a state "may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, [re-
quiring] the [defendant] to respond to a suit brought to enforce [those obliga-
tions] can.., hardly be said to be undue." International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
13
Logue: If the International Shoe Fits, Wear It: Applying Traditional Per
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
requirement defines the necessary relationship between the forum state
and the defendant, it "is the essence of specific jurisdiction."52 Thus, a
proper application of the "arise from or relate to" requirement is essential
to ensuring that the due process requirements have been met.53 Because
of the absence of a clear test, two general theories of interpretation for the
"arise from or relate to" requirement have been developed.5 4
The first theory of interpretation employs a "but for" analysis in deter-
mining whether the cause of action arose from the defendant's activities
in the forum state.55 Under this theory, "a cause of action 'arises from'
the defendant's forum-state activities when 'but for' those activities the
cause of action would not have arisen."56 The second theory of interpreta-
tion involves a determination of whether the defendant's forum activities
have substantive relevance to the cause of action.57 To be substantively
relevant to the cause of action, the defendant's forum state activities must
be the "proximate cause" of the litigation. 58 The existence of two differ-
52. Maloney, supra note 22, at 1271.
53. See id. ("[A] misapplication of 'arise from or relate to' is tantamount to a
misapplication of due process."); see also Stan Mayo, Note, Specific Jurisdiction: Time
for a "Related to" Analysis, 4 REv. LITIG. 341, 342-43 (1985) (noting that proper ap-
plication of due process cannot occur without proper application of "arise from or
relate to" requirement).
54. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10 (1984) (declining to address "arising
out of" or "related to" requirement). But see Maloney, supra note 22, at 1276-77
(noting present requirement of "arise from" or "relate to" test). For a discussion
of the two general theories, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
55. See Maloney, supra note 22, at 1277. This analysis is also referred to by
some courts as the "made possible by" or the "lie in the wake of' test. See id. (citing
Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1216 (7th Cir. 1984);
In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 231 (6th Cir. 1972)).
56. See Alexander v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir.
1991) (describing "but for" test as requiring relationship between cause of action
and defendant's forum contacts be such that "but for" defendant's contacts with
forum state, cause of action would not have occurred); Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding "but for" test requires show-
ing that cause of action would not have occurred "but for" defendant's forum
activities).
57. See Maloney, supra note 22, at 1282 (applying substantive relevance test to
"arise from or relate to" requirement).
58. See id. at 1282-83 (explaining that proximate cause test used in tort law is
applied for determining "substantive relevance"). In order to constitute a proxi-
mate cause, the defendant's activities must not only have a "but for" relationship to
the cause of action, but the litigation must also be a foreseeable consequence of
the defendant's actions. See id. at 1283 (discussing nature of proximate cause test).
Because the "but for" test does not require foreseeability, application of the proxi-
mate cause standard results in a denial ofjurisdiction in many instances when the
"but for" test would allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1282.
Debate over which causation test should be applied in jurisdictional analysis
centers upon the issue of which test better promotes the principles announced in
International Shoe. See id. at 1299-1301 (arguing that "but for" approach better ad-
vances core principals of International Shoe and its progeny); Rose, supra note 30, at
1588-90 (advancing substantive relevance test as much more consistent with due
process jurisdictional principals). Some commentators argue that the "but for"
1226 [Vol. 42: p. 1213
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss4/3
ent tests, however, has led to some confusion in determining whether a
defendant's conduct gives rise to a cause of action.
59
3. Reasonableness
The third prong of the minimum contacts test examines the reason-
ableness of requiring a defendant to litigate in the forum state. 60 The
Supreme Court has outlined five factors to consider in determining
whether an assertion ofjurisdiction is fair: (1) the burden on the defend-
ant; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the in-
terstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies; and (5) the shared interests the several states have in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
6
'
approach is more consistent with modem jurisdiction principals because it focuses
less on structure and more on flexibility. See Maloney, supra note 22, at 1300 ("The
modified 'but for' test will allow courts to achieve flexibility without completely
sacrificing structure."). On the contrary, other commentators argue that the sub-
stantive relevance, or proximate cause, test is more consistent with due process
requirements because it provides a greater degree of certainty to the jurisdictional
inquiry. See Rose, supra note 30, at 1588-89 (stating that substantive relevance test
is most consistent with case law and has great merit of clarity). Thus, according to
the second group of commentators, the proximate cause standard allows for a
greater degree of predictability as to where a person may be subject to suit. See id.
at 1586-88 (arguing that proximate cause test is appropriate for jurisdictional anal-
ysis because it provides clarity and certainty as to where one may be held subject to
suit). Neither group of commentators, however, has helped the courts reach a
consensus as to which standard to apply. See Maloney, supra note 22, at 1282-89
(noting disparity in circuit court decisions using both tests).
59. See Maloney, supra note 22, at 1270-71 (arguing for application of "arise
from or relate to" requirement in "firm and consistent" manner).
60. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987)
(considering reasonableness of litigating against Asahi in forum state).
61. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (listing five
factors to consider in determining fairness). The World-Wide Volkswagen Court
stated that
[i]mplicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that
the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an
appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, includ-
ing the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute ... the plain-
tiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.., the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con-
troversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fun-
damental substantive social policies.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations
omitted).
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has treated the first factor, the burden on
the defendant, as "a primary concern." Id.; see also Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 & n.10 (1982) (com-
menting that restrictions on state sovereignty act to preserve individual liberty in-
terests); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (stating that jurisdictional
requirements both limit state power and guarantee immunity from inconvenient
litigation); Charlotte Hoffmann, PersonalJurisdiction and the Due Process Clause: An
Evaluation of the Fairness Factors, 19 PAc. L.J. 1459, 1477 (1988) (noting that empha-
12271997] NOTE
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Although these five factors are supposed to be balanced against mini-
sis on burden to defendant has been characterized as abandonment of federalism
concerns). But see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482-84 (holding Michigan franchise
subject to jurisdiction of Florida court without concern for burden on defendant).
The Burger King Court noted that
[b]ecause "modern transportation and communications have made it
much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State
where he engages in economic activity," it usually will not be unfair to
subject him to the burdens of litigating in another forum for disputes
relating to such activity.
Id. at 474 (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
In dealing with a foreign defendant, however, the Supreme Court in Asahi
reemphasized the significance of the burden to the defendant:
Certainly the burden on the defendant in this case is severe. Asahi has
been commanded by the Supreme Court of California not only to trav-
erse the distance between Asahi's headquarters in Japan and the Superior
Court of California... but also to submit its dispute with Cheng Shin to a
foreign nation's judicial system. The unique burdens placed upon one
who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant
weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of per-
sonal jurisdiction over national borders.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. For a further discussion of the facts of Asahi and the
Supreme Court's holding, see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
Although the first factor has been applied inconsistently, the Supreme Court
has traditionally given considerable weight to the second factor of the fairness
analysis. See William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 Asuz. ST.
L.J. 599, 629 (1993) (noting that Supreme Court has given second factor "consid-
erable attention"). Most often, the Court uses this prong of the analysis to stress
the value of providing residents with a forum to pursue their claims. See id. ("A
common theme is the state's interest in providing a forum for state residents to
pursue claims against outsiders.").
For examples of situations in which the Supreme Court found sufficient state
interests, see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483; McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. For examples of
situations in which the Supreme Court found the state's interest insufficient, and
thus, the exercise ofjurisdiction unfair, see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115; Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1977).
Although fairness concerns dominate the analysis of the second factor, the
availability of an alternate forum in which the plaintiff can bring suit is often the
central consideration under the third factor. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (finding
assertion of jurisdiction unreasonable when alternate forum was available and
more convenient for litigation); McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (holding defendant amena-
ble to suit in part because of plaintiffs inability to finance suit in another state).
The fourth element, however, is essentially concerned with efficiency in
resolving the lawsuit. Three separate factors are considered: (1) the place where
the claim arose; (2) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation; and (3) choice of law
principles. See Abramson, supra note 19, at 460-61 (discussing factors considered
under efficient resolution factor). The first factor focuses on the location of criti-
cal witnesses and evidence. See id. ("Where the forum is the place where the claim
arose, where all or most likely witnesses reside, or where critical evidence exists,
litigating the lawsuit in such a forum seems reasonable."). The second factor ques-
tions whether related claims may also be adjudicated in the forum state, so as to
avoid piecemeal litigation. See id. at 463 (explaining that single adjudication of
legal issues fosters efficient resolution of controversies). Finally, the third factor
considers whether it is more efficient to adjudicate claims in the forum whose
substantive law applies to the case. See id. at 464-65 ("If the court determines that
the forum state's substantive law applies to the case, then efficiency is served by
proceeding in that forum.").
1228
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mum contacts concerns, the Supreme Court traditionally has placed
greater emphasis on the contacts prong of the analysis. 6 2 For instance, in
World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court rejected Oklahoma's attempt at
exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant because of a lack of
sufficient contacts. 63 In doing so, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court ignored
both Oklahoma's strong state interest in adjudicating the claim and the
fact that the majority of the evidence was located in Oklahoma. 64 Simi-
Consideration of the fifth element of the analysis requires an examination of
the "procedural and substantive interests of other [states or] nations in a state
court's assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
For a discussion of the application of this factor to both foreign and domestic
defendants, see Abramson, supra note 19, at 465-68.
62. See Richman, supra note 61, at 634 (stating that fairness inquiry plays sub-
sidiary role to contacts prong); see also Hoffmann, supra note 61, at 1459-61, 1485
(arguing that application of minimum contacts test alone, without consideration
of fairness factors, is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements).
The Supreme Court's lone exception to the "contacts-over-fairness" trend is
found in Asahi, in which the burden to a foreign defendant was held to outweigh
the defendant's relationship with the forum state. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114-15.
Although the Asahi Court ultimately found it unreasonable to subject the defend-
ant to jurisdiction in California, the justices differed in their understanding of the
relationship between the minimum contacts and fairness prongs. See Hoffmann,
supra note 61, at 1459-61 (discussing two divergent positions that have arisen out of
Asahi with regard to relationship between contacts and reasonableness prongs). In
Justice O'Connor's view, a finding of sufficient minimum contacts is a threshold
requirement for consideration of the fairness factors. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114
("When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plain-
tiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious bur-
dens placed on the alien defendant."); Hoffmann, supra note 61, at 1460 ("Under
[Justice O'Connor's] approach, an examination of other factors cannot establish
the validity of an assertion of jurisdiction; the fairness factors may be considered
only to affirm or defeat jurisdiction.").
In his concurring opinionJustice Stevens rejected the approach taken byJus-
tice O'Connor:
An examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to deter-
mine whether a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitu-
tional. [Justice O'Connor's opinion] establishes ... that California's
exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi in this case would be "unreasonable
and unfair." This finding alone requires reversal; this case fits within the
rule that "minimum requirements inherent in the concept of 'fair play
and substantial justice' may defeat the reasonableness ofjurisdiction even
if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities." Accord-
ingly, I see no reason in this case for the plurality to articulate "pur-
poseful direction" or any other test as the nexus between an act of a
defendant and the forum State that is necessary to establish minimum
contacts.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
63. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299.
64. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Brennan con-
cludes that requiring the defendant to litigate in Oklahoma is both fair and rea-
sonable. See id. at 305-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that
[t]he interest of the forum State and its connection to the litigation is
strong. The automobile accident underlying the litigation occurred in
Oklahoma. The plaintiffs were hospitalized in Oklahoma when they
brought suit. Essential witnesses and evidence were in Oklahoma. The
17
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larly, in Burger King, the Supreme Court upheld Florida's exercise ofjuris-
diction over a Michigan resident by emphasizing the defendant's ties to
Florida and minimizing the inconvenience of having the defendant liti-
gate there.65
B. Applying Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace
To date, only a small body of case law has developed addressing juris-
dictional issues arising from contacts made through the Internet. 66 Most
of the cases addressing on-line issues have involved either First Amend-
ment, copyright, criminal or privacy issues.6 7 Nevertheless, a few courts
State has a legitimate interest in enforcing its laws designed to keep its
highway system safe, and the trial can proceed at least as efficiently in
Oklahoma as anywhere else.
Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415, 418 (1984) (denying Texas court's jurisdiction although
plaintiffs had no alternative American forum).
65. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483-84. In response to the defendant's inconven-
ience argument, the Court stated that "such considerations most frequently can be
accommodated through a change of venue." Id. at 484; see Keeton v. Hustler Maga-
zine, 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (upholding jurisdiction based on contacts even
though plaintiff lacked substantial connection with forum state).
The Burger King Court commented upon the relation between minimum con-
tacts and fairness:
Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established mini-
mum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered
in light of other [fairness] factors to determine whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substantial jus-
tice".... [The fairness factors] sometimes serve to establish the reasona-
bleness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than
would otherwise be required. On the other hand, where a defendant
who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to
defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence
of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77 (citations omitted).
66. See Zembek, supra note 5, at 357 (noting limited number of cases that
have addressed establishment of personal jurisdiction through Internet contacts).
67. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
release of program adversely affecting Internet violated Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(1994))); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding Internet provider was not directly liable for unau-
thorized copies of copyrighted work made and stored in its computer while trans-
mitting computer bulletin board service's (BBS) Usenet posting to and from
Internet); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 685 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that copyright law supported seizure of on-line pirated video game
software); United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 544 (D. Mass. 1994)
(holding federal wire fraud statute inapplicable to copyright infringement action
against pirate BBS operator); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret
Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432, 441 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (holding governmental search and
seizure of on-line systems limited by Electronic Communication Privacy Act and
Privacy Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1851 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) and the Privacy Protection Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000aa-1 to -12 (1994))), aff'd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); Cubby, Inc. v. Com-
18
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have addressed the issue of jurisdiction arising from on-line contacts.68
In addressing on-line contacts, the courts have applied traditional ju-
risdiction principles and analysis.69 The novelty of basing jurisdiction on
contacts arising out of the on-line environment, however, has created
some confusion among these courts.
70
1. Finding Personal Jurisdiction
One of the first cases to address the issue of jurisdiction arising from
computer-related contacts was Plus System, Inc. v. New England Network,
Inc.7 1 In Plus System, the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado held that the defendant, a Connecticut automatic teller
machine (ATM) organization, was amenable to jurisdiction in Colorado
because the defendants used the plaintiff's computer in Colorado through
telephone lines. 72 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that
puServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (limiting CompuServe's liabil-
ity as publisher of on-line material); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,
No. 31063-94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (assigning liabil-
ity to Prodigy as publisher).
68. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D. Conn.
1996) (concluding that nonresident defendant's advertising through Internet was
sufficient to support Connecticut's exercise of jurisdiction); Plus Sys., Inc. v. New
England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111, 120 (D. Colo. 1992) (finding that nonres-
ident defendant was subject to jurisdiction in Colorado when defendant communi-
cated with plaintiff's computers located in Colorado); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System
One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (hold-
ing nonresident defendant's use of on-line services located in Florida was insuffi-
cient basis to support exercise of jurisdiction by Florida court).
69. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1266 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding that defendant purposefully availed himself to forum state); Plus Systems,
804 F. Supp. at 120 (finding defendant's connection with forum state substantial
enough to make exercise of jurisdiction reasonable).
70. Compare Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1257 (holding that on-line contact was suffi-
cient to support exercise of jurisdiction), and Inset Systems, 939 F. Supp. at 164
(finding nonresident defendant's use of domain name sufficient to subject defend-
ant to jurisdiction in forum state), with Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353 (refusing to
exercise jurisdiction in breach of contract action when defendant's only contact
with forum state was use of plaintiff's on-line computer database).
71. 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992).
72. Id. at 118-19. In Plus System, the plaintiff, Plus System, Inc., was a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Colorado. See id. at 114. Plus
System administered and provided support for a national automated teller
machine (ATM) network comprised of approximately 4500 depository financial
institutions. See id. The financial institutions utilize regional networks that are
connected through a national network organized and maintained by Plus System.
See id. Thus, the Plus System network enables customers owning an ATM card
marked with the "Plus" trademark to access their financial institution from any
ATM machine bearing the same "Plus" mark. See id. at 114-15. Plus System is re-
sponsible for routing each individual customer's financial transaction to the
proper network and setting all accounts on the network. See id. at 115. In return
for its routing and settling services, Plus System is paid a small fee per transaction
by the bank issuing the card used in the transaction. See id.
19
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[t]he intangible nature of [Plaintiffs] services should not be per-
ceived as detracting from their very real and valuable function; in
the days of inferior technology, there could be no dispute over
minimum contacts had Defendant physically flown to Colorado
with its ATM machine and asked Plaintiff to perform switching
services on it. Similarly, Defendant's use of Plaintiffs computer
system to effect the same result is no less an availment of Colo-
rado and its laws. 7 3
Thus, the Plus System court applied traditional jurisdiction analysis in de-
termining that the defendant did purposefully avail itself of the benefits
and protections of Colorado's laws.7 4
In another recent decision, Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,
75
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that a
nonresident defendant's use of an Internet domain name was sufficient to
subject it to jurisdiction in Connecticut.76 The defendant, a Massachusetts
corporation, was sued for using the plaintiff's trademark as its Internet
domain name.7 7 The court based its finding of jurisdiction on the ra-
As administrator, Plus System imposed an additional 3-cent service charge for
certain types of transactions. See id. According to Plus System, the defendant, New
England Network, Inc. ("NENI"), a membership corporation responsible for main-
taining one of the local networks comprising a part of the Plus System network,
failed to implement this additional charge in its network. See id. at 114-15. Plus
System instituted a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado to obtain a declaratory judgment and damages against NENI for
its inaction. See id. at 115. In its motion for summary judgment, NENI, a Connecti-
cut corporation, challenged the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.
See id. at 115.
73. Id. at 119. The Plus System court also held that Colorado's exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant was reasonable:
We ... find that the Defendant's activities or their consequences have a
substantial enough connection with Colorado to make the exercise ofju-
risdiction reasonable. Defendant and its sponsored institutions receive
their services and make payments to PLUS in Colorado. All of Defend-
ant's communications with Plaintiff were directed to Plaintiff in Colo-
rado. The consequences of the dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants
have a substantial enough connection with Colorado to make the exer-
cise of jurisdiction reasonable.
Id. at 119-20.
74. Id. at 117-19.
75. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
76. Id. at 164. A "domain name" is analogous to a street address in that it
constitutes one's Internet address. See id. at 163 (discussing nature of domain
names and their use). Domain names consist of three parts: "the first part identi-
fies the part of the Internet desired, such as the world wide web (www); the second
part is usually a name identifying the company or user; and the third part identi-
fies the type of institution, such as government (.gov) or commercial (.com)." Id.
77. See id. at 163. The plaintiff, Inset Systems, Inc., is a computer software
corporation incorporated and having its principal place of business in Connecti-
cut. See id. at 162. On October 21, 1986, the plaintiff was issued and became the
registered owner of the federal trademark "INSET." See id. at 163. Soon thereaf-
ter, the defendant, Instruction Set, Inc., began using "INSET.COM" as its Internet
1232 [Vol. 42: p. 1213
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tional that, in establishing its Internet site, the defendant purposefully di-
rected its activities not only toward Connecticut, but to all states. 78
Furthermore, the Inset Systems court reasoned that because the defendant
advertised its business through the Internet, which "can reach as many as
10,000 Internet users within Connecticut... [the defendant] purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business within Connecticut."79
2. Finding Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Unlike the courts in Inset Systems and Plus System, the Florida District
Court of Appeal in Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,80 refused
to grant jurisdiction in a breach of contract action involving the use of an
on-line computer database.8 1 In Pres-Kap, the defendant, a New York
travel agency, contracted for the use of the plaintiff's computer reserva-
tion system located in Florida.8 2 Although the defendant forwarded
monthly payments to the plaintiff's billing office in Miami, all other busi-
ness between the parties was conducted through the plaintiff's New York
office.8 3 As a result, the court reasoned that because the majority of the
domain address. See id. It was not until the plaintiff attempted to obtain the same
Internet address in March, 1995, that the plaintiff became aware of the defend-
ant's Internet domain address. See id. Because the plaintiff had not authorized the
defendant's use of its trademark, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant to
recover damages for trademark infringement. See id.
78. See id. at 165.
79. Id. The Inset Systems court also found that holding the defendant amena-
ble to jurisdiction in Connecticut was reasonable. See id. The court based its find-
ing of reasonableness upon the minimal distance between Massachusetts and
Connecticut and Connecticut's substantial interest in adjudicating the dispute be-
cause it involved issues of Connecticut common and statutory law. See id. Thus,
the court concluded that "its finding of minimum contacts in this case comports
with notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id.
80. 636 So. 2d 1351 (1994).
81. See id. at 1353-54.
82. Id. at 1352. In Pres-Kap, the plaintiff was a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Florida. See id. at 1351. The plaintiff provided travel
agents nationwide with access to its computerized database for the purpose of mak-
ing travel reservations. See id. Upon entering into a lease agreement with the
plaintiff, a travel agency is provided computer terminals that allow the agency to
access the plaintiffs database in Florida. See id. at 1351-52. With the plaintiff's
service, a travel agent is able to book airline, automobile and hotel reservations in
connection with the agency's operations through the phone lines. See id. at 1352.
From 1982 to 1989, the defendant entered into three similar lease contracts
with the plaintiff's predecessor, a division of Eastern Airlines. See id. In the previ-
ous contracts, a forum selection clause was included that required the defendant
to submit to jurisdiction in Florida in the event of a dispute. See id. The present
contract, however, did not include such a clause. See id.
83. See id. Business relations between the plaintiff and defendant in Pres-Kap
arose from a nationwide marketing effort by the plaintiff. See id. A representative
from the plaintiffs New York office solicited the defendant's business and initiated
contract negotiations. See id. In December 1989, the defendant executed the lease
agreement in New York and forwarded it to the plaintiffs Florida office, where it
was executed by a representative of the plaintiff. See id.
21
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business under the contract was conducted in New York, the defendant
could not have reasonably expected litigation in Florida.8 4 Moreover, the
court held that the defendant's awareness of the location of the computer
database was irrelevant because any financial benefit derived by the de-
fendant "was a financial gain arising from a New York, not a Florida based
business transaction."85 Thus, the Pres-Kap court based its denial of juris-
diction on a lack of sufficient contacts between the defendant and the
forum state. 86
Early in 1991, the defendant notified the plaintiff's New York office that the
reservation system was malfunctioning. See id. Upon the plaintiff's failure to repair
the equipment, the defendant discontinued its monthly payments under the lease
agreement. See id. The plaintiff filed this action to recover for breach of the lease
agreement. See id.
84. See id. at 1353. The court discussed the contacts involved in the present
case:
[T] he record clearly shows that the defendant is a New York corporation
doing business in New York as a travel agency with no offices outside of
New York; that the plaintiff, through its New York office, solicited the
defendant's business in the state of New York where the subject contract,
as well as prior contracts, were negotiated by the parties and executed by
the defendant; that the computer equipment supplied under the con-
tract was delivered to the defendant in New York; and when the defend-
ant experienced difficulties with the computerized equipment,
complaints were directed to the New York office of the plaintiff.
Id. at 1352. Based on the "totality of the circumstances," the Pres-Kap court con-
cluded that the defendant's reasonable expectation was not that it would be held
subject to jurisdiction in Florida, but that "New York courts would be resorted to in
the event of a dispute." Id. at 1353. Thus, the court held that compliance with the
minimum contacts due process requirement had not been met. See id.
85. Id. at 1353. The Pres-Kap court explained that although the defendant
may have benefited financially from the use of the Florida-based computer service,
such financial benefit arose from a New York-based business transaction. See id.
Thus, according to the Pres-Kap court, the defendant's knowledge of the location
of the computer database was irrelevant because such knowledge would not
change the defendant's reasonable expectations of having disputes arising under
the agreement resolved in a New York court. See id.
86. See id. at 1352-53. In considering its decision, the Pres-Kap court expressed
its reservations as to a contrary finding. See id. at 1353. According to the court,
holding such a defendant amenable to suit would have far-reaching implications
for users of on-line services because it would render them subject to suit in any
state where the supplier's database is located. See id. Specifically, the court found
that such a decision would affect the "[1] awyers, journalists, teachers, physicians,
courts, universities, and business people throughout the country [that] daily con-
duct various types of computer-assisted research." Id. According to the court, the
exercise ofjurisdiction over such users would be "wildly beyond the [ir] reasonable
expectations.., and, accordingly, the result offends traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." Id.
In his dissenting opinion,Judge Barkdull ignored such concerns, arguing that
the defendant's prior contracts put it on notice "that it could reasonably expect to
be sued in the courts of Florida." Id. at 1354 (Barkdull, J., dissenting). Moreover,
Judge Barkdull argued that the exercise of such jurisdiction was reasonable given
the financial benefit the defendant received from the use of the Florida-based ser-
vice. See id. (Barkdull, J., dissenting).
1234
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Patterson, the plaintiff, CompuServe, was a computer information
service located in Columbus, Ohio.8 7 It provided subscribers with access
to computing and information services through the Internet. 88 In addi-
tion, CompuServe also operated as an electronic conduit to provide sub-
scribers with computer software products that originated from
CompuServe itself or from other third-party providers. 89 Computer pro-
grams distributed in this manner are commonly referred to as
"shareware."90  These third-party providers (commonly referred to as
'shareware providers") contract with CompuServe to store and market
their software on CompuServe's system. 91 In return, CompuServe receives
a fifteen-percent fee from every copy of shareware sold before remitting
the balance to the shareware's creator.92
The defendant, Richard S. Patterson, was a CompuServe subscriber
from Houston, Texas, who developed and marketed computer software
under the name of Flashpoint Development. 93 In 1991, Patterson entered
87. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260 (6th Cir. 1996).
88. See id. CompuServe is one of the leading commercial on-line services
"with over 4.3 million subscribers." American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 841 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Through CompuServe, a subscriber can electroni-
cally access more than 1700 information services. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1260
(discussing CompuServe).
89. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1260.
90. See id. Shareware is software, usually written by independent authors and
small publishing houses, marketed and distributed over the Internet under a li-
censing agreement. See CAvAzos & MORIN, supra note 1, at 63-64 (defining
shareware and discussing how it is used). The licensing agreement permits use of
the software for a specified time period, at the end of which users are asked to
register the software with the author if they intend to continue, to use it. See id. at
63. The software is usually registered by sending a registration fee. See id. Thus,
voluntary compliance by the user is required for shareware to generate revenue
because a user may or may not pay the creator's suggested licensing fee upon the
expiration of the specified trial period. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1260 (noting that
shareware only makes money if subscribers voluntarily pay licensing fees). Some
commentators have suggested that software distribution will eventually occur en-
tirely on-line, with shareware replacing over-the-counter sales. See David A.
Andelman,Joining the Ends of the Universe, MGMT. REv., Feb. 1996, at 54, 54 (predict-
ing that in ten years over 90% of software distribution will occur on-line); see also
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that
"[m]uch software is ordered over the Internet by purchasers who have never seen
a box").
A user registering shareware obtained through CompuServe is required to pay
the registration fee directly to CompuServe. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1260 (discuss-
ing CompuServe's procedure for licensing shareware to subscribers). From this
amount, CompuServe takes a 15% fee for its services and remits the balance to the
shareware's creator. See id.
91. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1260.
92. See id. CompuServe currently receives $3,000,000 in annual revenue from
shareware registration. Brief for Appellant at 4 n.2, Patterson (No. 95-3452).
93. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1260. Although Patterson became a member of
CompuServe from his computer in Texas, the CompuServe Service Agreement
23
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into a shareware registration agreement ("SRA") with CompuServe, in
which he agreed, to become a shareware provider.94 Although the agree-
ment was made through the Internet, the SRA provided that it was made
and entered into in Ohio.9 5 Moreover, the SRA also stated that Ohio law
would govern in the event of a dispute.9 6
Under the terms of the SRA, from 1991 through 1994, Patterson
transmitted and deposited thirty-two master software files, which were
stored in CompuServe's system and made available to CompuServe sub-
scribers for purchase. 97 The programs, "WinNav," "Windows Navigator"
and "Flashpoint Windows Navigator," were designed to help users navigate
their way around the Internet. 98 Patterson also placed advertisements for
his software on the CompuServe system, at least one of which included
price terms. 99 During the four years Patterson's software was available on
CompuServe's system, twelve Ohio residents purchased less than $650
worth of Patterson's software.100
In 1993, CompuServe developed and began marketing a program
similar to Patterson's under the name "WinNav."10 1 Consequently, in De-
cember of 1993, Patterson contacted CompuServe through electronic mail
and informed them that "WinNav," "Windows Navigator" and "Flashpoint
Windows Navigator" were common law trademarks owned by himself and
("Service Agreement") provides that the contract was made and performed in
Ohio. See id.
94. See id. The Patterson court noted that although it contained standardized
language prepared by CompuServe, the shareware registration agreement ("SRA")
required Patterson to type the word "Agree" at various points in the document in
order to demonstrate Patterson's recognition of the terms and conditions of the
agreement. See id. at 1260-61.
95. See id. at 1260. The Service Agreement provided that "it is to 'be governed
by and construed in accordance with' Ohio law." Id. (quoting Center for Democ-
racy & Technology, CompuServe Service Agreement (visited Jan. 21, 1998) <http://
www.cdt.org/privacy/onlineservices/CompuServe/CompuServe.html>). In dis-
cussing the Service Agreement, the Patterson court noted that it appeared to be a
standardized agreement prepared by CompuServe. See id.
96. See id. As with the Service Agreement, Patterson entered into the SRA
with CompuServe from his computer in Texas. See id. at 1261. Thus, Patterson
assented to the terms of the SRA in Texas and, thereafter, transmitted his assent to




100. See id. CompuServe asserts, however, that Patterson marketed his
software exclusively through their system. See id. CompuServe also contends that
although only 12 copies of Patterson's software were sold to Ohio residents, over
1800 copies of Patterson's software programs were distributed its subscribers. See
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, No. C2-94-91, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7530, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 1995).
101. See Patterson, C2-94-91, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20352, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 11, 1994).
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his company.'0 2 CompuServe then ceased use of the "WinNav" trademark
and changed the name to "CompuServe Navigator."' 0 3 Patterson contin-
ued to complain, claiming that his trademark extended to use of the term
"Navigator."10 4 CompuServe ultimately began negotiations with Patterson
concerning the trademark violations, whereupon Patterson demanded at
least $100,000 to settle his potential claims.' 0 5 In response, CompuServe
filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio.
10 6
In this action, CompuServe sought a declaration that it had not in-
fringed any common law trademarks owned by Patterson or FlashPoint
Development. 10 7 Patterson then filed a consolidated motion to dismiss
CompuServe's complaint on several grounds, including lack of personal
jurisdiction.' 0 8 The district court, finding the contacts between Patterson
102. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1261. Similar to conventional mail, electronic
mail, commonly referred to as "e-mail," allows computer network users to corre-
spond with one another on-line. See CAvAZos & MORIN, supra note 1, at 5 (discuss-
ing nature and use of electronic mail). E-mail is sent to a user's Internet address
and is delivered into the recipient's mailbox, where it becomes available to the
recipient the next time he or she is on-line. See id. Although there are several
means available for communicating on-line, e-mail is one of the most widely used
services. See Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 927
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting prominence of e-mail among modes of communication
over Internet), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997). In fact, e-mail is beginning to gain
wide acceptance as a means of communication among the business community.
See Gilbert Chan, Small Firms Continue to Spur Growth in State, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar.
24, 1997, at IBlI (noting that 28% of small business owners use e-mail); Beth W.
Orenstein, E-mail Gains Enthusiastic Backers in Business Circles, E. PA. Bus. J., Mar. 3,
1997, at 10 (discussing rise in use of e-mail among area businesses). One of the
main ways in which e-mail benefits business is the reduction in cost, as paper flow
is dramatically reduced and long distance phone calls are no longer necessary. See
Orenstein, supra, at 9 (noting that companies making greater use of e-mail have
experienced reduction in amount of paper used). Moreover, the ease with which
e-mail can be composed and sent allows business to run more efficiently. See id.
(discussing how companies have grown dependent upon e-mail in daily
operations).
In his e-mail to CompuServe, Patterson asserted that CompuServe's actions
infringed upon his trademark and, thus, constituted an unfair trade practice. See
Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1261. Patterson's marks, however, were not federally regis-
tered trademarks. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Patterson (No. 95-3452).
103. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Patterson (No. 95-3452).
104. See id. CompuServe has used the mark "Navigator" in the sale of more
than 76,000 copies of software from 1989 to date. See id.
105. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1261. In its brief, CompuServe asserted that ne-
gotiations were conducted with Patterson through both on-line and written com-
munications. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Patterson (No. 95-3452). CompuServe
estimated it would lose $10.8 million in software sales revenue if Patterson's trade-
mark allegations were true. See id.
106. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1261.
107. See id.
108. See id. Patterson's motion to dismiss was based on several grounds, in-
cluding lack of subject matter jurisdiction, insufficiency of process and failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patter-
son, No. C2-94-91, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20352, at *21 (Aug. 11, 1994).
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and Ohio too tenuous, granted Patterson's motion and dismissed the case
for lack of personal jurisdiction. 10 9 CompuServe's motion for a rehearing
109. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1261. In making its decision, the district court
only considered the pleadings and papers filed in support of and in opposition to
the motion to dismiss. See id. The district court applied a three-part test for deter-
mining whether jurisdiction over the defendant was proper: (1) whether the de-
fendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in the forum state; (2)
whether the cause of action arose in the forum state; and (3) whether the defen-
dant has substantial enough contacts with the state that the exercise ofjurisdiction
over the defendant is reasonable. See Patterson, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20352, at *7.
In applying the first prong, the district court held that the contacts between
Patterson and CompuServe were of such a minimal nature that there was no show-
ing of purposeful availment. See id. at *17. The district court reached this decision
through analogizing the present case to prior cases involving interstate business
negotiations and relationships. See id. at *11. The court found that, unlike the
Supreme Court's decision in Burger King, no extensive negotiations took place be-
tween Patterson and CompuServe prior to the agreement. See id. at *16. Rather,
the district court held that CompuServe's contractual terms were standardized and
offered "on a 'take it or leave it' basis." Id. Moreover, the district court found that
the contract between the parties did not contemplate an ongoing business rela-
tionship, but rather a "'minimal course of dealing.'" Id. at *17 (quoting Reynolds
v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Based upon these findings, the court found that the defendant did not purpose-
fully avail himself of the benefits of Ohio law. See id.
Under the second prong, the district court held that the dispute did not arise
out of Patterson's contacts with Ohio. See id. at *18-19. The court reasoned that
the presence of Patterson's software on CompuServe's server was irrelevant be-
cause the defendant could have claimed a trademark violation against Com-
puServe regardless of where his software was stored. See id. Moreover, the court
held that Patterson's use of CompuServe's network to inform the plaintiff of the
clash in legal interests was also irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. See id. at
*19.
In assessing the reasonablness of subjecting Patterson to jurisdiction in Ohio,
the district court concluded that "it would be manifestly unreasonable for this or
any Ohio court to exercise jurisdiction over this case." Id. at *20-21. The court
further reasoned that the minimal contacts between Patterson and Ohio would
make the exercise ofjurisdiction inherently unreasonable. See id. at *20. The dis-
trict court stated that
[i]f this were simply a suit brought by CompuServe to collect a small
amount from a Texas resident who, while seated at his computer termi-
nal, became a member of the CompuServe network, the Court would
have a very difficult time concluding that the exercise ofjurisdiction over
that customer in the State of Ohio was proper. Although the nature of
the controversy between the parties in this case is different, the Court
concludes that it is no more connected with purposeful activities within
the State of Ohio than the standard customer dispute ....
Id.
Upon deciding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Patterson, the district
court found it unnecessary to address the other issues raised in Patterson's motion
to dismiss. See id. at *21. The court then dismissed the claim, concluding that
"CompuServe is free to reinstitute this action in a court where personal jurisdiction
over the defendant can be obtained." Id.
1238
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was denied.1 10 CompuServe subsequently appealed the district court deci-
sion to the Sixth Circuit."'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision,
finding that Patterson's contacts with Ohio were sufficient to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction."l 2 In reversing the district court, the ap-
pellate court applied traditional jurisdictional analysis and concluded that
it was reasonable to hold Patterson amenable to suit in Ohio.u13 There-
fore, finding that personal jurisdiction over Patterson was present, the
court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. u 4
1. Scope of Ohio's Long Arm Statute
As a preliminary measure, the court needed to determine whether
state law permitted the district court to exercise jurisdiction over Patter-
son.'1 5 Under Ohio's long arm statute, an Ohio court may exercise per-
110. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, No. C2-94-91, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7530, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 1995). According to the district court, a motion
for rehearing could only be granted upon a showing that there was a mistake of
law or fact, or that new evidence exists that could not have previously been discov-
ered. See id. at *2. In its memorandum in support of the motion for rehearing,
CompuServe argued that the district court failed to appreciate certain facts in mak-
ing its decision. See id. at *4. The district court found this argument was without
merit because CompuServe was merely asking the court to reconsider evidence
already presented at trial. See id. at *6. CompuServe's second argument was based
on the discovery of new evidence relating to the number of, software packages Pat-
terson sold through CompuServe's systems. See id. The district court denied the
petition for a rehearing because the new evidence could have been discovered
previously. See id. at *7.
111. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1261. On appeal, Patterson failed to file an ap-
pellate brief and was not present at oral arguments. See id.
112. See id. at 1260. Because the district court failed to conduct an evidentiary
hearing before ruling on Patterson's motion to dismiss, the appellate court was
required to consider the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to Com-
puServe. See id. at 1262 (citing Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458-59
(6th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, because of the district court's failure to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing, the appellate court could not consider Patterson's affidavit in the
analysis. See id. at 1263. Therefore, to defeat Patterson's motion to dismiss, Com-
puServe was only required to make a prima facie showing ofjurisdiction. See id.
113. See id. at 1263. The Patterson court addressed the proper analysis to ap-
ply: "As always in this context, the crucial federal constitutional inquiry is whether,
given the facts of the case, the nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with
the forum state that the district court's exercise ofjurisdiction would comport with
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. (quoting International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
114. See id. at 1268-69.
115. See id. at 1262 (applying law of forum state subject to limitations of Due
Process Clause). In order to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a
federal court in a diversity action must determine whether the defendant is amena-
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sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident if the claim arises from a business
transaction. 116 To determine the scope of the statute, the Patterson court
relied upon prior Sixth Circuit decisions that have established the "trans-
acting business" clause as permitting the exercise of jurisdiction to the
federal constitutional limits of due process." 7 Thus, because Patterson
conducted business in Ohio through his relationship with CompuServe,
the Patterson court held that exercising jurisdiction over Patterson was per-
missible under Ohio law. 118
In addition to this inquiry, however, the court also considered
whether exercising jurisdiction over Patterson would violate his due pro-
cess rights." 9 Therefore, the court also had to determine whether exer-
cising jurisdiction over Patterson would "comport with 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."1 2 0
2. Due Process Analysis
In its due process analysis, the Patterson court adopted the test articu-
lated in Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Indusustries, Inc.,' 2 1 to determine
whether exercising jurisdiction over Patterson was consistent with due pro-
cess requirements. 122 Under Southern Machine, jurisdiction is only proper
ble to suit under the state's long arm statute. See id. (citing Reynolds v. Interna-
tional Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1115 (6th Cir. 1994)).
116. See id. at 1262 (applying Ohio long arm statute). Under section
2307.382 (A) (1) of the Ohio Revised Code, an Ohio court "may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action
arising from the person's transacting any business in this state." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.382(A) (1) (Anderson 1995). For a discussion of long arm statutes
and their application, see FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.12-.13, at 13847.
117. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1262 (citing Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1116). In In-
Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1972), the
Sixth Circuit established that the Ohio legislature intended section
2307.382 (A) (1) to extend to the constitutional limits. See id. The transacting busi-
ness clause of section 2307.382(A)(1) provides that "[a] court may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of
action arising from the person's: (1) Transacting [of] any business in this state."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A) (1). The In-Flight court recognized that it was
an established Ohio rule that interpretations of comparable legislation enacted
elsewhere should be given significant weight. In-Flight, 466 F.2d at 225. The In-
Flight court reasoned that because the Ohio legislature adopted language similar
to the Illinois long arm statute, which was enacted prior to the Ohio statute and
construed as extending jurisdiction to the limits of due process, the Ohio statute
must be construed to achieve an identical result. Id.
118. Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1262-63 (concluding it was reasonable to subject Pat-
terson to suit in Ohio).
119. See id. at 1262 (noting Ohio personal jurisdiction cases require examina-
tion of due process limits because Ohio long arm statute allows for exercise of
jurisdiction to extent permissible under Constitution).
120. Id. at 1263 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)).
121. 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
122. Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1263. In Southern Machine, a nonresident defendant
contracted to have the plaintiff manufacture and sell machine attachments on
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when (1) a nonresident defendant purposely avails himself or herself of
the privileges of the forum state; (2) the cause of action arises from the
defendant's activities in the state; and (3) the defendant's acts create such
a substantial connection with the forum state as to make the exercise of
jurisdiction reasonable. 123
a. Purposeful Availment Requirement
In addressing the first prong of the Southern Machine due process test,
the Patterson court concluded that Patterson purposefully availed himself
of the privilege of doing business in Ohio. 124 To satisfy the purposeful
availment requirement, a court must decide whether the nonresident de-
fendant's contacts with the forum state created a substantial connection
with that state, such that these contacts should make the defendant "'rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court there."1 2 5 Although the Patter-
son court found the connection between Patterson and Ohio to be
undeniable, the court found it difficult to characterize the connection as
"substantial.' 126 Nevertheless, after considering the fact that Patterson de-
which the defendant owned the patent rights. Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at 378
(discussing relationship between plaintiff and defendant). After determining that
the Tennessee long arm statute authorized jurisdiction, the court applied tradi-
tional jurisdictional analysis to the facts to determine 'whether subjecting the de-
fendant to jurisdiction in Tennessee was consistent with due process. See id. at 382
("We are applying a constitutional standard defined in the broadest terms of 'gen-
eral fairness' to the defendant."). Upon conducting its jurisdictional analysis, the
Southern Machine court found that because the defendant had intentionally con-
tracted with a Tennessee corporation, whose only manufacturing plant was in Ten-
nessee, the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in Tenessee. See id. at 383. Moreover, finding that Tennessee had a sub-
stantial interest in the litigation, the court held that it was not unreasonable to
subject the defendant to suit there. See id. at 385 ("[W]hen the contract is with a
resident of Tennessee, the State's interest in resolving a suit based on the contract
... cannot be doubted.").
123. See Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at 381 (stating criteria for outer limits of in
personam jurisdiction). The Southern Machine test was based upon the principles
established in both McGee and Hanson., See id. (noting origin of criteria for estab-
lishing in personam jurisdiction). The three-prong approach adopted by the Sixth
Circuit in Southern Machine had already been adopted by the Fifth, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits. See id. at 381 n.17 (noting that other circuits have adopted similar
approach).
124. Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1263-67. In commenting upon the relevance of the
purposeful availment requirement, the Patterson court stated that "the question of
whether a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing busi-
ness in the forum state is 'the sine qua non for in personamjurisdiction."' Id. at 1263
(quoting Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at 381-82).
125. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75
(1985)). The court emphasized that the purposeful availment requirement does
not require that the defendant be physically present in the forum state. See id. at
1264. The only requirement is a showing that the defendant purposefully directed
his or her efforts toward residents of another state. See id. (noting that physical
presence is not required for personal jurisdiction).
126. Id. The court relied on the fact that Patterson subscribed to Com-
puServe and entered into the shareware agreement on his own accord. See id.
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liberately entered into a written agreement with an Ohio corporation to
market his wares in Ohio and elsewhere, the court concluded that Patter-
son did create a substantial connection with Ohio. 127 Thus, because Pat-
terson should have reasonably anticipated that his actions would have
consequences in Ohio, the court held that Patterson had purposely
availed himself of the privileges of that state. 128
b. Cause of Action Arising from Patterson's Activities
Pursuant to the second prong of Southern Machine, the Patterson court
next determined that CompuServe's claim arose out of Patterson's activi-
ties in Ohio. 129 Under the "cause of action requirement," an action must
Moreover, the court noted that it was Patterson who was repeatedly sending his
software to Ohio. See id. The court also considered the fact that Patterson initi-
ated the events that led to the filing of the suit by informing CompuServe of the
possible trademark violations. See id. Although the Patterson court found Patter-
son's actions as unquestionably directed toward Ohio, the court stated that " [t] he
real question is whether these connections with Ohio are 'substantial' enough that
Patterson should reasonably have anticipated being haled into an Ohio court." Id.
127. See id. (distinguishing contract cases relied upon by district court). In
contrast to the district court, the Patterson court found the de minimis amount of
software sales in Ohio irrelevant. See id. at 1265 (focusing upon deliberate and
repeated nature of Patterson's contacts and not on fact that such contacts yielded
little revenue in Ohio). The court reasoned that focusing solely on the amount of
sales in Ohio ignores the sales Patterson may have made to others elsewhere. See
id. at 1265-66 (noting relationship of Ohio to sales made in other forums). Thus,
the court took into consideration Patterson's software sales to both Ohio residents
and nonresidents alike in assessing whether Patterson had established substantial
contacts with Ohio. See id. (considering effects of sales made in other forums on
establishment of personal jurisdiction in Ohio). For a further discussion of the
district court's holding on the issue of substantial contacts, see supra note 125 and
accompanying text.
In concluding that Patterson created a substantial connection with Ohio, the
Patterson court analogized the present case to an Ohio Supreme Court case in
which the court held that substantial contacts were created when a nonresident
defendant made long-distance telephone calls to Ohio, shipped goods there for
sale and utilized distribution facilities there for distributing its products. See Patter-
son, 89 F.3d at 1265 (analogizing to U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. Mr. K's
Foods, Inc., 624 N.E. 2d 1048 (Ohio 1994). The Patterson court reasoned that, like
the nonresident defendant in the Ohio case, Patterson frequently contacted Ohio
and repeatedly sent goods there, and thus, in effect, appointed CompuServe as his
electronic distributor. See id. (analogizing relationship between Patterson and
CompuServe to relationship between manufacturer and distributor). Therefore,
the court found Patterson's conduct substantial enough to support Ohio's exercise
ofjurisdiction. See id.
128. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1265 (focusing upon fact that Patterson both
initiated contact with CompuServe and injected his product into stream of
commerce).
129. Id. at 1267. "Patterson's contacts with Ohio are certainly related to the
operative facts of that controversy." Id. The Patterson court commented upon the
"arise out of" requirement:
Even though we have found that Patterson purposefully availed himself of
Ohio privileges, we must also find that CompuServe's claims against him
arise out of his activities in Ohio if we are to find the exercise ofjurisdic-
1242
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arise out of the same operative facts as the defendant's contacts with the
forum state.1 3 0 Although the district court held that Patterson's contacts
with Ohio were unrelated to CompuServe's alleged trademark violations,
the appellate court disagreed. 13 ' The appellate court noted that because
common law trademark rights are obtained through actual use in com-
merce, Patterson's trademark would have been created in Ohio.13 2 There-
fore, the circuit court reasoned that any trademark violation would have
occurred, at least in part, in Ohio.'
3 3
c. Reasonableness Requirement
In considering the third prong of the Southern Machine analysis, which
is the reasonableness of requiring Patterson to defend himself in an Ohio
court, the Patterson court found that Patterson's status as an entrepreneur,
along with Ohio's interest in resolving the dispute, outweighed any bur-
den of having to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction.1 3 4 In evaluating the rea-
sonableness of exercising jurisdiction, the court considered three factors:
(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interest of the forum state; and
(3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.135 In balancing these fac-
tors, the Patterson court found that Ohio's interest in resolving the dispute
and CompuServe's interest in obtaining relief, outweighed any burden
tion proper. If a defendant's contacts with the forum state are related to
the operative facts of the controversy, then an action will be deemed to
have arisen from those contacts.
Id. (citations omitted).
130. See id. (citing Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d
1110, 1119 (6th Cir. 1994)).
131. See id.
132. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1267 (noting that Patterson marketed and sold
software only through Ohio-based CompuServe).
133. See id. (discussing effect of Ohio contacts on location of alleged trade-
mark violations). In concluding that the cause of action arose from Patterson's
actions, the Patterson court also considered the fact that CompuServe's declaratory
judgment action arose out of Patterson's threats, through regular and electronic
mail, to bring suit against CompuServe if CompuServe did not pay him $100,000
for using his marks. See id. at 1261, 1267. The court held Patterson's threats satis-
fied the "arise out of" requirement because these contacts with Ohio gave rise to
the present case. See id. at 1267.
134. Id. at 1267-68. In considering whether it was reasonable to subject Pat-
terson to jurisdiction in Ohio, the Patterson court stated that because the first two
prongs of the Southern Machine test were satisfied, an inference of reasonableness
could be made. See id. (citing American Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164,
1170 (6th Cir. 1988); Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374,
384 & n.30 (6th Cir. 1968)). Thus, the Patterson court reviewed the case under a
presumption that the reasonableness prong had been met. See id.
135. See id. In its initial discussion of the reasonableness requirement, the
court enumerated an additional factor for consideration: "'the interest of other
states in securing the most efficient resolution of controversies.'" Id. (quoting
American Greetings, 839 F.2d at 1169-70). The court, however, failed to address this
factor in assessing the reasonableness of subjecting Patterson to jurisdiction in
Ohio. See id.
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placed upon Patterson.' 6 Accordingly, the Patterson court reasoned that
although it may be burdensome for Patterson to defend a suit in Ohio, he
was made aware of such a possibility through his connections with
Ohio.' 3 7
3. Court's Limitation of Its Decision
Realizing the novel issue presented under the facts of the case, the
Patterson court found it important to limit the scope of its holding.'38 The
court provided:
We need not and do not hold that Patterson would be subject to
suit in any state where his software was purchased or used; that is
not the case before us. We also do not have before us an attempt
by another party from a third state to sue Patterson in Ohio for,
say a "computer virus" caused by his software, and thus we need
not address whether personal jurisdiction could be found on
those facts. Finally, we need not and do not hold that Com-
puServe may, as the district court posited, sue any regular sub-
scriber to its service for nonpayment in Ohio, even if the
subscriber is a native Alaskan who has never left home. Each of
those cases may well arise someday, but they are not before us
now.l 9
Thus, the court attempted to ensure that its holding would not be con-




In Patterson, the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that Patterson was
subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio.' 4 ' Consistent with the court's
determination, Patterson's contacts with Ohio were clearly sufficient to
support a finding of minimum contacts.142 Moreover, the court properly
136. Id. The court noted Ohio's strong interest in resolving dispute involving
Ohio trademark law and CompuServe's strong interest regarding the impact of the
decision on its relationships with other "shareware" providers who direct their ac-
tivities toward Ohio. See id. The court realized Texas' interest in resolving a dis-
pute involving one of its citizens. See id. at 1268 n.8. The court also emphasized
that CompuServe is a subsidiary of H&R Block and both of these entities have
divisions located in Texas. See id.
137. Id. at 1268.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citations omitted).
140. See id. (stating that "because of the unique nature of this case, we deem it
important to note what we do not hold").
141. Id. at 1268-69.
142. For a further discussion of the Patterson court's determination that Pat-
terson established sufficient contacts to support the exercise of jurisdiction in
Ohio, see infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
1244 [Vol. 42: p. 1213
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weighed the reasonableness factors in concluding that the exercise of ju-
risdiction over Patterson was fair.
143
1. Patterson's Contacts with the State of Ohio
Although Patterson presented a novel and seemingly complex issue,
the Sixth Circuit adopted the correct approach in focusing solely upon the
nature and quality of Patterson's contacts with Ohio.' 4 4 Thus, as long as
143. For a discussion of the reasonableness of subjecting Patterson tojurisdic-
tion in Ohio, see infra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
144. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1263-67 (discussing purposeful nature of Patter-
son's contacts with Ohio). Several commentators have addressed the complexity
of reconciling cyberspace with traditional jurisdictional principles. See KENT D.
STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAw § 10.02[2], at 10-5 (1996) (stating that In-
ternet allows interaction without "many of the physical acts that traditionally pro-
vide sufficient minimum contacts"); Byassee, supra note 1, at 199 (noting that
cyberspace activity strains legal principles governing judicial power over individu-
als); Counts & Martin, supra note 26, at 1126 (predicting difficulties in applying
purposeful availment analysis in cyberspace); Michael J. Santisi, Note, Pres-Kap,
Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.: Extending the Reach of the Long-Arm Statute
Through the Internet?, 13J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 433, 433 (1995) (stat-
ing that "computers have added another dimension to the area of personal juris-
diction law"); see also I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime For "Cyberspace, "55 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 993, 994 (1994) (noting that customary legal paradigms are often
inadequate to resolve conflicts arising in cyberspace). The primary concern cen-
ters around the fact that Internet contacts take place without physical interaction,
which has traditionally formed the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. See Byas-
see, supra note 1, at 199 ("Activity in cyberspace . . . creates new relationships
among individuals that differ from their analogues in the more usual, physical
existence."); Zembek, supra note 5, at 350 ("The ultimate question is whether an
internet user's electronic contact, at near light speed, allows a court to exercise
specific jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant, when the electronic contact
was so slight that the forum was unaware of an internet user's virtual presence.").
Moreover, the lack of understanding of how contacts occur through the Internet
adds to the confusion. See Zembek, supra note 5, at 365 (arguing that district
court's decision in Patterson "fail[ed] to apply the appropriate legal paradigm to
the developing law of cyberspace").
As one commentator notes, however, an Internet user is capable of con-
tracting for services in the forum state and deriving financial benefit from that
contract. See Santisi, supra, at 435 (noting that Internet allows active performance
of contract without entering forum state); see also Zembek, supra note 5, at 346
("Traditional legal notions do fit complex cyberspace questions once one realizes
that both the actors and activities are real."). An Internet user, therefore, is capa-
ble of directing activity toward the forum state that can cause serious consequences
for that state. See Byassee, supra note 1, at 199 (stating that "inhabitants of cyber-
space are . . . citizens of a physical jurisdiction"). Consequently, the Internet
should simply be thought of as a new communication medium through which obli-
gations are created for individuals throughout the world. See Zembek, supra note
5, at 347 & n.41 (noting that "Cyber-activity is not above the law").
Under the minimum contacts inquiry, the essential question is whether the
nonresident defendant has established "certain minimum contacts with ... [the
forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). The minimum contacts approach is premised upon the notion that the
exercise of the privilege of conducting business within a state may give rise to the
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the defendant has purposefully directed his or her activity toward the fo-
rum state, the means through which he or she does so is less important to
the jurisdictional inquiry. 145 Thus, the court properly addressed the In-
ternet as a new communication medium, which is capable of causing sub-
stantial effects in the physical world.
146
obligation to respond to suit in that state. See id. at 319 (noting reasonableness of
requiring corporations to respond to suits stemming from exercise of privileges in
forum state). Therefore, because on-line contacts may give rise to consequences in
another state, cyberspace is not above the law of personal jurisdiction and should
be evaluated upon the traditional jurisdiction principles enunciated in Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny. See Zembek, supra note 5, at 347-48 (noting that in-
jured party must recover from Internet user in manner that comports with due
process limitations). The only caution, however, is making certain that courts ap-
ply the traditional principles with a proper understanding of the nature of how
contacts occur through cyberspace. See id. at 357 (stating that "failure to compre-
hend the nature of the internet" has caused courts to misunderstand applicability
of existing jurisprudence).
145. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (finding
jurisdiction proper when "commercial actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed'
toward residents of another State"). The fact that the majority of Patterson's con-
tacts with Ohio were through the Internet does not change the jurisdictional in-
quiry of whether the nature and quality of the nonresident defendant's conduct is
sufficient to render the defendant subject to suit in the forum state. See Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (noting that it is nature and quality of acts that render
defendant liable to suit in forum state). In Burger King, the Supreme Court reiter-
ated the principle ennuciated in International Shoe that a nonresident defendant
need not be present in the forum state to allow the exercise of jurisdiction. See
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (noting that substantial amounts of business are trans-
acted without physical presence in forum state). The Burger King Court noted that
"it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of
business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines,
thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted." Id. The Court further noted that "[as] long as a commercial actor's
efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State... an absence
of physical contacts can [not] defeat personal jurisdiction there." Id. Thus, the
proper focus ofjurisdictional analysis is not on the medium used to establish those
contacts, but on whether the nonresident defendant's activities have created a sub-
stantial connection with the forum state. See id. at 475.
146. See Zembek, supra note 5, at 347 (noting consequences of cyberactivity
on physical world). Because the Internet exists in connection with the physical
world, courts must analyze it in terms of other technological innovations to resolve
jurisdictional issues. See id. at 367 (arguing that "existing paradigms... can resolve
cyberspace's complex jurisdictional issues"). Thus, to determine the proper juris-
dictional paradigms to apply to cases arising in cyberspace, the courts must ask
"are there cases where courts have addressed jurisdiction in the context of other,
conceptually parallel technological advances, that would aid in resolving personal
jurisdiction questions that arise from cyberspace?" Id. at 368. For a further discus-
sion of the jurisdictional paradigms courts should use in addressing contacts aris-
ing in connection with technological advances, see id. at 368-80.
In discussing jurisdictional issues raised by the Internet, another commentator
recommends that "[w]ith online services ... the focus should not be on the
method of communication or contact, but rather on the activity that can be con-
ducted via the service, and how that activity affects relevant parties in the forum."
STUCKEY, supra note 144, § 10.02[2], at 10-8 to -9; see also Counts & Martin, supra
note 26, at 1133 (concluding that jurisdictional analysis should focus on realities of
1246 [Vol. 42: p. 1213
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In analyzing Patterson's contacts with Ohio, the Sixth Circuit appro-
priately concluded that Patterson purposefully established substantial rela-
tions with the state of Ohio. 147 As explained in World-Wide Volkswagen, the
purposeful availment requirement is satisfied when the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state are such that he or she "should reasonably antic-
ipate being haled into court there."148 In the instant case, Patterson
intentionally reached beyond the borders of Texas and retained the serv-
ices of an Ohio Internet provider. 14 Further, Patterson's contract with
cyberspace communication). But see Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts on the Net:
Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 81 (1996)
(arguing that "[t] raditional notions of jurisdiction are outdated in a world divided
not into nations, states, and provinces but networks, domains, and hosts"). Proper
application of such precedent, however, will require courts "to have a clear under-
standing of the technology that permits global cyberspace communication."
Counts & Martin, supra note 26, at 1116-17.
147. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1263-67.
148. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
149. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1266 (finding Patterson made purposeful con-
tacts with Ohio). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the purposeful availment
issue within the framework of Burger King. See id. In Burger King, the Supreme
Court held that two Michigan defendants who entered into a franchise agreement
with the plaintiff, a Florida corporation, had established minimum contacts with
the state of Florida. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-82 (finding defendant's pur-
posefully availed themselves of benefits of forum state's laws). The Court noted
that the defendants "'reach[ed] out beyond' Michigan" in order to benefit from
affiliation with the plaintiff's nationwide organization. Id. at 479-80. As a result,
the Court found that the defendants had purposefully directed their activity to-
ward the forum state and had established sufficient minimum contacts. See id. at
480 (finding it reasonable for defendants to litigate in forum).
Similarly, in Patterson, the defendant "reached out" beyond Texas and con-
tracted with CompuServe for the purpose of selling his software. See Patterson, 89
F.3d at 1266. Patterson could have subscribed to an Internet provider in Texas,
but instead chose to deal with CompuServe. See id. Similar to the defendant's
actions in Burger King, Patterson's conduct demonstrated an intent to benefit from
the particular services CompuServe had to offer. See Zembek, supra note 5, at 364
n.123 (noting Patterson could have used a local Internet provider). Thus, Patter-
son's contacts with Ohio were not random or fortuitous, but rather purposefully
directed toward the state of Ohio for the purpose of financial gain. See Patterson,
89 F.3d at 1266-67 (holding that "Patterson purposefully availed himself of the
privilege of doing business in Ohio").
Although it could be argued that Patterson's conduct merely amounted to
placing his software into the stream of commerce, Patterson's contacts with Ohio
were more than just foreseeable. See id. at 1265 (finding "ample contacts exist to
support the assertion of jurisdiction"). In Asahi, the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not
an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). The Asahi Court
continued, stating that "[a]dditional conduct of the defendant may indicate an
intent... to serve the market in the forum State, for example.., marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the
forum State." Id.
In Patterson, the defendant, Patterson, entered into an agreement with Com-
puServe in which CompuServe essentially agreed to act as Patterson's electronic
distributor. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1260, 1265. Thus, Patterson's contacts with
19971 1247NOTE
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CompuServe was not for a single transaction, but instead provided the
framework for an ongoing relationship between a shareware provider and
a software distributor.150 Moreover, for three years Patterson maintained
continual relations with CompuServe from which he derived commercial
benefit.15 1 Thus, from these multiple relations with CompuServe, and
pursuant to Burger King, Patterson should reasonably have been aware that
his contacts with Ohio might give rise to suit there. 152
Ohio were more than foreseeable. See id. at 1265 (holding that Patterson did not
merely place his product into stream of commerce).
150. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1265 ("Patterson sent software to CompuServe
repeatedly for some three years, and the record indicates that he intended to con-
tinue marketing his software on CompuServe."). In discussing the significance of
contracting for future services, the Burger King Court found that the defendants'
entrance into a contract involving continuing relations further evidenced pur-
poseful conduct on behalf of the defendants. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480. The
Court further held that the long-term relationship between plaintiff and defend-
ants was not "random" or "fortuitous." Id. Moreover, the Court also found that
the course of dealing between the plaintiff and defendants supported the exercise
of jurisdiction because the defendants continually communicated with the plain-
tiff's Florida office when problems arose. See id. at 480-81 (noting that decision-
making authority vested in forum state).
In the present case, Patterson operated under the SRA for three years. See
Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1261. When the dispute between Patterson and CompuServe
arose, "Patterson repeatedly sent both electronic and regular mail messages to
CompuServe about his claim." Id. at 1266. Under Burger King, this additional in-
formation further supports a finding of purposeful availment. See id. (discussing
Burger King holding).
151. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1265-66.
152. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (holding that "j]urisdiction is proper...
where the [defendant's] contacts .. .create a 'substantial connection' with the
forum State").
The Sixth Circuit also properly concluded that the cause of action arose "out
of and related to" Patterson's activities in Ohio. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1267. The
dispute in Patterson centered around the existence of a common law trademark.
See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1267. Under common law trademark principles, rights are
acquired through actual use of the trademark in commerce. SeeJ. THOMAS McCAR-
THY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 16.01[1], at 16-3
(3d ed. 1992) ("At common law, ownership of a trademark.., in the United States
is obtained by actual use of a symbol to identify the goods or services of one seller
and distinguish them from those offered by others."); see also United States v. Stef-
fens, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (noting that common law trademark rights are appro-
priated only through actual use in commerce); Younker v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 191 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ohio 1963) (stating that only actual use in business gives
rise to trademark rights). Therefore, because Patterson marketed and sold his
software exclusively on CompuServe's server in Ohio, Patterson established his
trademark rights under Ohio law. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1267. Accordingly, any
violation of that trademark would have occurred in Ohio. See Vanity Fair Mills,
Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956) (stating that trademark
infringement occurs where product is "passed off'); Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of
Boca, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that trademark in-
fringement occurs where product is purchased). But see Acrison, Inc. v. Control &
Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445, 1448 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (stating that damage to
intellectual property rights occurs where owner suffers damage).
1248
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2. Reasonableness of Subjecting Patterson to Suit in Ohio
The Sixth Circuit correctly determined that subjecting Patterson to
jurisdiction in Ohio would be reasonable. As a practical matter, allowing
Ohio to exercise jurisdiction in the present case would subject Patterson
to a substantial financial burden.15 3 Given the conveniences of modem
transportation and communication, however, any burden that Patterson
would suffer would not amount to a denial of due process.' 54 Moreover,
Patterson's intentional contacts with Ohio provided him with sufficient
notice of the possibility of suit in Ohio. 1 55 It would therefore be unfair to
153. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1268. The Patterson court failed to embellish
upon the burden to Patterson in considering the reasonableness of subjecting him
to Ohio's jurisdiction. See id. (limiting consideration of reasonableness to state-
ment that it "may be burdensome for Patterson to defend a suit in Ohio"). Instead,
the court characterized Patterson as an entrepreneur aware of the risk of possibly
having to litigate in Ohio. See id.
The Patterson court's lack of concern over the burden to the defendant is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Burger King. See Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 483-84 (concluding that subjecting Michigan residents to jurisdiction in Florida
was merely inconvenient). The Burger King Court held that the burden to the
Michigan defendants in having to defend themselves in a Florida court did not
"achieve constitutional magnitude." Id. at 484. The Supreme Court, however, has
traditionally afforded greater consideration to the burden on the defendant in
considering the reasonableness factors. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-
92 (noting that burden to defendant is "always a primary concern"); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (stating that jurisdictional requirements both
limit state power and guarantee immunity from inconvenient litigation). For a
further discussion of the Supreme Court's emphasis upon the burden on the de-
fendant in weighing the reasonableness factors, see supra note 61 arid accompany-
ing text.
154. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 483-84 (finding that Michigan defendants
were merely inconvenienced by having to defend suit in Florida court); see also
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (noting that progress in communications and transporta-
tion has decreased burden of defending suit in foreign tribunal); McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (stating that transportation and
communication development reduced burden to defendant litigating in foreign
jurisdiction).
155. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1262-69 (finding that person employing com-
puter network service to market products should expect suit in state where service
is located). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
the burdens associated with requiring a defendant to litigate in a foreign
jurisdiction:
The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly administration of the
laws," gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows poten-
tial defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit.
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State" it has clear notice that it is sub-
ject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation
by procuring insurance, passing expected costs on to customers, or, if the
risks are too great, severing its connection with the State.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (citations omitted).
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have allowed Patterson to avoid interstate obligations that he voluntarily
assumed. 156
Additionally, CompuServe's interest in obtaining relief and Ohio's in-
terest in adjudicating the dispute outweighed any inconvenience Patterson
may have experienced. 157 Because CompuServe stood to lose over $10
million if Patterson's allegations were true, CompuServe clearly had a
strong interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.158 Further-
more, Ohio's interest in adjudicating the matter was also substantial be-
cause the case involved an Ohio company as well as trademarks that arose
under Ohio common law.
159
Because all three prongs of the jurisdictional inquiry were satisfied,
the defendant was properly subjected to jurisdiction in Ohio. 160 The fact
that the majority of Patterson's contacts with Ohio occurred through elec-
tronic communications should not affect the jurisdictional inquiry. 16 1 Pat-
terson's actions created a substantial connection with Ohio from which he
156. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (noting that "the Due Process Clause may
not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that
have been voluntarily assumed"). In voluntarily entering into the contract with
CompuServe, Patterson was afforded the "'benefits and protections'" of Ohio's
laws. Id. at 476. In such a case, requiring the defendant to suffer the burdens of
litigation in that forum is not unreasonable. See id. (holding that persons who avail
themselves of privileges of conducting business in forum state should submit to
litigation in forum state).
157. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)
("When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plain-
tiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious bur-
dens placed on the . . . defendant.").
158. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1268. Early in the development of modern per-
sonal jurisdiction law, the Supreme Court recognized the plaintiffs interest in ob-
taining convenient and effective relief. See Richman, supra note 61, at 631 (noting
Supreme Court's early recognition of plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief). In
McGee, the Supreme Court based its finding ofjurisdiction, in part, upon the fact
that the plaintiff would be "at a severe disadvantage if... forced to... [litigate in]
a distant State." McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. The Supreme Court affirmed its position
in Asahi, in which it held that a consideration of the plaintiffs interest may over-
ride serious burdens placed on a nonresident defendant. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
For a further discussion of the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and ef-
fective relief, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
159. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1268; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482-84 (con-
cluding that Florida's interest in providing forum for its residents was so substan-
tial that it outweighed burden upon defendant); McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (noting
that state often has a "manifest interest in providing effective means for redress for
its residents"). For a further discussion of the forum state's interest in adjudicating
claims, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
160. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1263-68.
161. See id. at 1265 (finding that quality of contacts, and not their status, de-
termines existence of personal jurisdiction); see also Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43,
47 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding that nature of telephone call and e-mail messages
established minimum contacts); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1126-27 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (determining that minimum contacts were
established through quality of defendant's Internet contacts).
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gained financial benefit. 1 62 As a result, Patterson was obligated to defend
any suit in Ohio if a dispute arose from his actions there. 16 3 Thus, the
Sixth Circuit properly applied existing jurisdictional principles in holding
Patterson amenable to jurisdiction in Ohio.
V. SOCIAL AND LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PA7TERsoN DECISION
Because cyberspace is void of physical boundaries and contacts, it has
traditionally been considered inherently at odds with fundamental princi-
ples of personal jurisdiction.16 4 In holding Patterson subject to jurisdic-
tion in Ohio, however, the Sixth Circuit has essentially determined that
on-line jurisdiction exists. 165 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit has managed to
reconcile the inconsistencies by establishing a framework for determining
162. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1263-69 (overruling district court's finding that
Patterson's contacts were insufficient). For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's juris-
dictional analysis, see supra notes 112-40 and accompanying text. For a further
discussion of the district court's holding, see supra note 109 and accompanying
text.
163. See Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1268-69 (holding that connections between Pat-
terson and Ohio were substantial, and that it was reasonable for Ohio court to
assert personal jurisdiction); see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487 (obligating de-
fendant to litigate in forum state after finding "substantial and continuing relation-
ship" with forum); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)
(finding "sufficient contacts" with forum state to make it "reasonable and just" for
defendant to litigate in forum).
164. See Burnstein, supra note 146, at 81-82 ("Cyberspace confounds the con-
ventional law of territorial jurisdiction and national borders."); see also Richard
Raysman & Peter Brown, Resolving Jurisdiction and Venue Issues on the Internet, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 10, 1996, at 3 (commenting that "[t]he boundaryless nature of the In-
ternet" raises concerns over whether it is "possible to enforce laws against a defend-
ant residing beyond a court's territorial boundaries, based on conduct which takes
place on-line"). In discussing the inherent discrepancies between the Internet and
cyberspace, one commentator stated that
[t]raditional notions of jurisdiction are outdated in a world divided not
into nations, states, and provinces but networks, domains, and hosts.
Cyberspace confounds the conventional law of territorial jurisdiction and
national borders. In cyberspace, it does not matter at all whether a site
lies in one country or another because the networked world is not organ-
ized in such a fashion.
Burstein, supra note 146, at 81-82. Further, it can be concluded that as a result of
this discrepancy, "[w]ell-known jurisdictional doctrines such as 'purposeful avail-
ment' lose meaning in cyberspace.... The networked world is different and re-
quires a different approach." Id. at 82; see also Byassee, supra note 1, at 219
(concluding that traditional jurisdictional analysis is inappropriate for virtual
communities).
165. See William J. Cook, Four Internet Jurisdiction Cases Break Rule of Thumb,
CHI. LAW., Oct. 1996, at 76 (asserting that Patterson has provided basis for establish-
ing Internet jurisdiction); Raysman & Brown, supra note 164, at 3 (stating that,
through Patterson, "the Sixth Circuit expanded the scope of the minimum contacts
test to include personal contacts that were almost entirely electronic in nature");
Mark E. Staib, In PersonamJurisdiction in Cyberspace, LITIG. NEws, Jan. 1997, at 1, 12-
13 (noting that Patterson court properly applied traditional jurisdictional principles
in deciding that on-line contacts meet federal .due process requirements).
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when a defendant's electronic contacts give rise to obligations in a given
state. 166  , .
In addition to establishing a framework for jurisdictional analysis in
cases of its kind, Patterson provides a basis for ensuring fairness in on-line
litigation. Thus, by determining that on-line contacts may provide a basis
for jurisdiction, Patterson offers assurance to Internet users that nonresi-
dent defendants will not be permitted to avoid obligations arising from
their on-line activities. 167 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's emphasis on limit-
ingjurisdiction to situations in which the defendant intentionally created
contacts with the forum will also serve to ensure that Internet users will
not be subject to jurisdiction anywhere in the world. 168
166. See Cook, supra note 165, at 76 (arguing that owners of intellectual prop-
erty rights on Internet can expect courts to weigh Patterson decision factors in de-
ciding jurisdictional inquiry). Prior to the existence of case law concerning
jurisdiction and the Internet, "an unfortunate Internet jurisdiction rule of thumb
developed: Internet lawsuits are brought at the defendant's location." Id. This
rule resulted in a clear advantage to infringers of intellectual property rights and
subjected plaintiffs to substantial expense and inconvenience. See id. (discussing
effects of applying default rule in deciding jurisdictional inquiry based on Internet
contacts).
167. See id. (arguing that plaintiffs can now firmly enforce their rights). In
discussing the lack of suits arising from Internet activity, one commentator stated
that
[i]n the old days, circa 1988 to 1994, Internet ftp sites, Usenet groups,
and pirate computer bulletin boards openly trafficked unauthorized
copyrighted and trade secret materials. The individuals behind this traf-
fic articulated their above-the-law attitude as the "spirit of the Internet."
Back then ... [I] itigation was infrequent because the relatively small
sales losses [resulting from illegal postings] did not justify the legal fees
necessary to chase infringers.
Id. With the recent explosion in the Internet community, however, "[c]opyright
owners now face the complete destruction of their potential market as a result of
unauthorized Internet postings." Id. With the advent of the Patterson decision,
"[o]wners of intellectual property posted on the Internet can now aggressively en-
force their rights." Id.
168. See Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351,
1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating concern that allowing on-line contacts to
serve as basis for exercise ofjurisdiction would subject on-line users to jurisdiction
anywhere in world). In Pres-Kap, the Florida District Court of Appeal voiced its
concern over the far-reaching implications of allowing on-line contacts to establish
a basis for jurisdiction. See id. The court's concern was primarily based upon its
unwillingness to hold the user of a computer database subject to suit in any state
"in which [the] supplier's.., database happen[s] to be located." Id. As Zembek
notes in his article, however, on-line contacts give rise to legal obligations and
should not be used as a shield to liability. See Zembek, supra note 5, at 347-48
(" [W] hether or not an individual acted under the cloak of an e-person in a virtual
land is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether a court may determine the party's re-
spective obligations.").
One on-line defendant has already benefited from the protections established
under Patterson. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (following Patterson and finding defendant did not purposefully
direct activities toward forum state). In Bensusan, the defendant, a Missouri resi-
dent, posted a "website" on which he promoted his club, "The Blue Note." See id.
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Because of the Sixth Circuit's limitation of its holding, commercial
Internet users are most likely to be affected by Patterson.1 69 Because com-
mercial users constitute the majority of Internet users, however, Patterson
will have a substantial effect upon the Internet as a whole. 170 Although
at 297. The plaintiff, a New York corporation, owned and operated a New York
club also called "The Blue Note." See id. Upon accessing the defendant's website
and finding a logo substantially similar to that it used as a trademark, the plaintiff
filed suit in New York alleging trademark infringement. See id. at 297-98 (noting
basis for defendant's claim). Relying upon the reasoning in Patterson, the District
Court refused jurisdiction over the defendant on the basis that he had not "pur-
posefully avail[ed] himself of the benefits of New York" in merely maintaining his
website. Id. at 301. The court specifically stated:
King has done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the benefits of
New York. King, like numerous others, simply created a Web site and
permitted anyone who could find it to access it. Creating a site, like plac-
ing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or
even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed
toward the forum state. There are no allegations that King, actively
sought to encourage New Yorkers to access hi's site, or that he conducted
any business-let alone a continuous and systematic part of its business-
in New York.... Bensusan's argument... is insufficient to satisfy due
process.
Id. (citation omitted). The district court discussed Patterson:
Although [Patterson] ... reached a different result, it was based on vastly
different facts. In that case ... [t] he user ... specifically targeted Ohio
by subscribing to the service and entering into a separate agreement with
the service to sell his software through the Internet. Furthermore, he
advertised his software over the service and repeatedly sent his software to
the service in Ohio. . . . This action, on the other hand, contains no
allegations that King in any way directed any contact to, or had any con-
tact with, New York or intended to avail itself of any of New York's
benefits.
Id. at 301 (citations omitted). But see Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328, 1333-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (subjecting California resident to jurisdiction in
Missouri based solely upon defendant's maintenance of Internet website).
169. See DavidJ. Goldstone, LegalJurisdiction in Cyberspace: Locating the Seams on
the Web, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 24, 1997, at 1 (noting that the "crux of the
(Patterson] court's opinion is that '[s]omeone like Patterson who employs a com-
puter network service ... to market a product can reasonably expect disputes with
that service to yield lawsuits in the service's home state"' (quoting CompuServe,
Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996))); see alsoJohn Fellas, Do Elec-
tronic Links Support Personal Jurisdiction? Sixth Circuit Answers Affirmatively, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 30, 1996, at S4 (noting that "[t]he central factor underlying the [Patterson]
court's decision... was that Patterson's relationship with CompuServe was akin to
that between a manufacturer of a product and a distributor of a product in an-
other state").
170. SeeJILL H. ELLSWORTH & MATTHEW V. ELLSwORTH, MARKETING ON THE
INTERNET: MULTIMEDIA STRATEGIES FOR THE WORLD WIDE WEB 14-15 (1995) (exam-
ining domain distribution on World Wide Web). By the second quarter of 1995,
commercial users constituted 65% of all Internet users. See id. (noting growth in
commercial sector of Internet users); see also Koh Su Haw, E-Commerce: Technology
Can Bypass the Legal Pitfalls, Bus. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996, at 16 (reporting study pre-
dicting that Internet cash transactions will reach nine billion by year 200). For
more recent statistics on the composition and growth of the Internet, see Paul
Clerkin, NUA Internet Surveys (visited Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.nua.ie>.
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Patterson's holding may have a "chilling effect" on commercial growth on
the Internet, it may also stimulate further commercial activity by providing
greater awareness of the legal obligations of on-line users. 17 1 Hopefully,
however, the threat of having to litigate in a foreign forum will encourage
commercial users to utilize forum selection clauses in their transactions,
thus eliminating jurisdictional debate and uncertainty. 172
In adapting traditional minimum contacts analysis to litigation arising
from Internet activity, Patterson has brought the jurisdictional wheel full
circle. Fifty years ago, International Shoe redefined jurisdictional principles
to address the nationalization of interstate commerce. 173 In holding that
Internet contacts may serve as a basis for establishing jurisdiction, Patterson




171. See Haw, supra note 170 at 16 (stating that until ambiguity in legal aspects
of doing business on Internet are resolved, growth of electronic commerce is
unlikely).
172. See STUCKEY, supra note 144, at § 10.02[2], at 10-10 (noting that forum
selection clauses "must be 'freely negotiated' and not 'unreasonable and unjust' so
that their enforcement does not offend due process"); Burnstein, supra note 146,
at 101 ("Forum selection clauses can bring order and stability to cyberspatial con-
tracts by substituting the highly-developed real-space legal order for the uncertain
and almost haphazard regime likely to result if courts are left to choose law in
cyber-disputes.").
Until a clear body of Internet jurisdiction jurisprudence develops, one com-
mentator recommends several other methods to avoid being held subject to juris-
diction in a foreign state. See Parry Aftab, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Due Process
Standards Vaty, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at S4 (discussing means of protection from
personal jurisdiction for commercial Internet users). In his article, this commen-
tator suggested that those with a commercial presence on the web can use dis-
claimers on their site that would limit access to residents of certain jurisdictions.
See id. In addition, he suggested that access could be limited through the use of
passwords, which allow access only to residents of certain states or countries. See id.
(offering means through which one may limit exposure to unwanted forums).
173. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-18 (1945) (ex-
tending jurisdictional principles to allow exercise of jurisdiction without physical
presence in forum state). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in International Shoe and its significance to personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,
see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
174. See Lori Irish Bauman, Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Advertising, COM-
PUTER LAw., Jan. 1997, at 5 (stating that "due process analysis need not remain
static in the face of technological change").
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